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A THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT DEFENSE OF THE VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ACT
MARCELLENE ELIZABETH HEARNt
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, with bipartisan 2 support, Congress passed the Violence
Against Women Act ("the VAWA7).s The most controversial part of
the VAWA is a new civil rights cause of action for women who have
been the victims of gender-motivated violent crimes.4 A woman who
is a victim of a violent crime may now sue the person who battered,
raped, or assaulted her for monetary damages, as well as for injunctive
and declaratory relief. Congress's authority to create the remedy has
t J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1991, Columbia University.
I would like to thank Professor Seth Kreimer for his suggestions while I was forming
my ideas for this Comment. I would also like to thank the editors of the Law Review for
all of their help and support.
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
2 In 1993, Senators Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Or.) agreed to re-
write Biden's version of the Violence Against Women Act originally introduced in
1990. SeeVictoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence
Against Women Act's CivilRights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 27 (1996).
3 Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. 4, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 16, 18, 42 U.S.C.). Note that the Act was passed as title IV of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). For a discussion of the other provisions of the
VAWA, see infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a). Because this Comment is about a statute that labels
domestic violence, rape, assault, and other violent crimes perpetrated against women
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been challenged in six reported cases.6 Although Congress explicitly
invoked its Fourteenth Amendment7 and commerce powers to enact
the civil rights remedy, this Comment argues that Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amer dment is an alternative source of Congress's power
to create a cause of action for private discrimination.9
A Thirteenth Amendment theory is necessary because there are
powerful state action, privacy, and federalism arguments that Con-
gress did not have the authority to enact the civil rights remedy under
either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment, for example, requires state action.'
The line between state action and private action is, in turn, influ-
as gender discrimination, I will use gendered pronouns to refer to the victims and
perpetrators. In doing so, I express no opinion as to whether the remedy could be
used in the context of same-sex violence. I use the term "victim" instead of the term
"survivor" favored by many in the battered women's and antiviolence movements be-
cause the statute and the congressional debate speak in terms of "victims."
6 See Crisonino v. New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(upholding the constitutionality of the VAWA civil rights remedy under the Com-
merce Clause); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (same); Seaton v.
Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (same); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375
(N.D. Iowa 1997) (same), rev'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339
(8th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (same). But see
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996)
(holding that the VAWA civil rights remedy is an unconstitutional assertion of Con-
gress's power, unjustified under either the 14th Amendment or the Commerce
Clause), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 8, 1998, atB3 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998).
7 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); id. § 5 ("The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
8 SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power"[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
9 This Comment is greatly influenced by Professor Akhil Amar's work on the ex-
pansive scope of the 13th Amendment, Professor Reva Siegel's work on the historical
roots of the privacy doctrine, and Professor Joyce McConnell's work which first ex-
plored the possibility of applying the 13th Amendment to victims of domestic vio-
lence. See Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403 (1993)
[hereinafter Amar, Remember the Thirteenth]; Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitu-
tion, 18 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POLy' 465 (1995) [hereinafter Amar, Women and the Constitu-
tion] (providing a brief history of women and the Constitution); Akhil Reed Amar &
Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response toDeShaney,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (applying the 13th Amendment to child abuse);Joyce
E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 4YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Pyivay, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (discussing the evolution of
the legal treatment of marital violence).
1o See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) ("[T]he prohibitions of the
[14th A]mendment are against state laws and acts done under state authority.").
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enced by societal conceptions of the public and the private that have
historically been used to deny women, and particularly married
women, their legal rights." The DeShaney case, in which the Supreme
Court refused to extend Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process protection to a victim of child abuse because there was no af-
firmative state action, 12 is a recent example of how the Supreme Court
declines to apply the Fourteenth Amendment in so-called "private"
arenas. A Thirteenth Amendment theory for the VAWA answers
Fourteenth Amendment objections to the statute based on both the
historical idea of privacy and the alleged lack of state action, because
the Thirteenth Amendment reaches private action.
The VAWA also has been plagued by objections based on federal-
ism. Critics argue that the VAWA will cause "state-federal jurisdic-
tional problems,"13 and place an undue burden on an already over-
burdened federal judiciary.14 Moreover, since the enactment of the
VAWA, the legitimacy of broad congressional action under the Com-
merce Clause has been challenged in United States v. Lopez.'5 Al-
though there is a growing consensus among the lower courts that
Congress had the power to enact the VAWA under the Commerce
Clause, the question of the VAWA's constitutionality is not yet set-
tled.'6 Should the Supreme Court or an appellate court strike down
the VAWA under Lap ez a Thirteenth Amendment theory may provide
an alternative basis for upholding the civil rights remedy. 7 A Thir-
teenth Amendment theory answers federalism objections to the
" See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 9, at 2177 (observing that in the Reconstruction pe-
riod "[t]he racial discourse of the private that the Court invoked... differed from the
discourses of affective privacy employed to rationalize elements of marital status law,"
but arguing that the discourses "functioned in strikingly similar ways: to explain laws
enforcing status privileges, once justified in overtly hierarchy-based discourses, with
reference to other, less contested, social values"); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 151
(David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (explaining how the law subordinates women by re-
fusing to regulate the private sphere); infra Part 11A2 (explaining the relationship
between the ideal of marital privacy and the legal treatment of violence against
women).
12 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see
infra Part II.A.1.
's See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.S.
's 514 U.S. 549, 566-68 (1995) (holding that a statute making possession of a fire-
arm in a school zone a federal offense exceeded Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause).
16 See infra Part II.C.
17 See infra Part II.C.
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VAWA because the Thirteenth Amendment represented a reordering
of state and federal relations.' 8
Although the traditional view is that the Thirteenth Amendment
applies only to systems of labor which are analogous to chattel slavery
and/or to racial discrimination, 9 this Comment follows the trend of
more recent scholarship and argues that the Thirteenth AmendmentS 20
should be viewed more comprehensively. Slavery involved familial
and private aspects of which Congress was well aware when it passed
the Thirteenth Amendment.2 If the Thirteenth Amendment is an
abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude for all time, then it
should abolish any form of servitude found in the twentieth century.2
Congress has the authority to legislate against "badges and incidents"
of slavery and involuntary servitude,2s and this Comment will argue
that violence against women is such an incident.
Part I discusses the VAWA civil rights remedy. It explains the sig-
nificance of a civil rights remedy in Part I.A; the advantages of this
remedy in Part I.B; the actual provisions of the VAWA civil rights
remedy in Part I.C; parallels to Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes
in Part I.D; and Congress's claims of authority to enact the remedy
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause in Part
I.E.
Part II discusses arguments that have been or may be used against
the civil rights remedy. Part II.A.1 details arguments grounded in the
notion of state action; Part II.A.2 explains arguments grounded in
privacy; Part II.A.3 addresses federalism arguments; and Part II.A.4
discusses Lopez. Part II.B explains the federal court challenges to the
VAWA. Part II.C concludes by arguing the need for an alternative
constitutional basis for the civil rights remedy.
Part III begins with an explanation of the traditional interpreta-
tion of Congress's Thirteenth Amendment powers. Part III.B pro-
poses a Thirteenth Amendment basis for the VAWA as an alternative
to that interpretation. Part III.C presents a working definition of
'8 See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
19 See infra Part III.A.
See sources cited infra note 283.
21 See infra Part III.C.
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872) ("[W]hile negro
slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it
forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter.").
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 28 (1883) (stating that the 13th Amend-
ment "clothes congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing
all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States").
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slavery that encompasses the differential experience of slave
women-including gender-differentiated physical and sexual vio-
lence-and rejects the notion that the Thirteenth Amendment ad-
dresses only labor relations. Part III.D debunks the common wisdom
that Congress never intended the Thirteenth Amendment to apply to
women by demonstrating that contemporaneous political actors
thought the Amendment had the potential to reorder familial rela-
tionships. Part III.E counters the argument that gender discrimina-
tion has been expressly removed from the Thirteenth Amendment's
purview by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge and its prog-
eny. Finally, Part III.F argues that Congress had the authority to en-
act the VAWA to address severe battering and child abuse, which are
present-day forms of involuntary servitude, and Part III.G presents the
proposition that violence against women today is an incident of both
nineteenth-century slavery and marriage.
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY OF THE VAWA
The VAWA!4 was passed in 1994 as part of the Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 19 94 .25 The statute includes a wide
variety of measures intended to address violence against women. For
example, it creates the federal criminal offenses of interstate domestic
violence, interstate stalking, and interstate violation of a protective
26order. It also provides mandatory restitution to victims of federalsex crimes;27 legislates fall faith and credit in each state for an order
24 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. 4, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
2Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
" See 18 U.S.C §§ 2261-2262 (1994). Like the civil rights remedy, the interstate
domestic violence provisions have been challenged as invalid exercises of Congress's
commerce power. See United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997)
(upholding § 2262(a) (1) under the Commerce Clause), cert. denied, No. 97-8095, 1998
WL 99344 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1998); United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 766 (4th Cir.)
(upholding § 2261(a) as a valid exercise of Commerce Clause powers by comparing
the statute to the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910 and the Mann Act), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 240 (1997); United States v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that Congress had the constitutional authority to pass § 2261 as a means of
regulating interstate commerce).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2248 (providing that those convicted of a chapter 109A sexual
offense must compensate the victim for the cost of medical care, physical therapy, lost
income, attorney's fees, and "any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate
result of the offense"); id. § 2259 (providing identical restitution to victims of child
sexual abuse).
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of protection issued in any other state;28 creates a national domestic
abuse hotline;2 supplies grants for the coordination of domestic vio-
lence prevention programs among local government and community
groups,s° and provides for and funds education and training pro-
grams for judges regarding gender-motivated crimes.5 ' In addition,
the VAWA changed the citizenship petitioning procedure for bat-
tered aliens and their children. 2
The most controversial part of the VAWA and the subject of this
Comment, however, is the civil rights remedy, which creates both a
substantive right to be free from gender-motivated violence and a
cause of action to enforce this right.33
A. The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy Establishes That Crimes of Violence
Motivated by Gender Are Civil Rights Violations
Congress enacted the civil rights remedy of the VAWA to provide
a new "[flederal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of
See id. § 2265 (ordering state courts to honor all protective orders issued in
other states or by Indian tribal courts). States have varying requirements for the rela-
tionship between the seeker of a domestic protective order and the abuser. In some
states, protective orders are available only to women who are or have been married to,
who share a child with, or who have cohabited with the batterer. See, e.g., D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-1001(5)(a) (1997) (requiring that a complainant in an intrafamily offense
be related to the offender by "blood, legal custody, marriage, having a child in com-
mon," or by having shared a residence).
See 42 U.S.C. § 10416.
so See id. § 10418.
31 See id. §§ 13991-13992, 14036.
32 See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. 4, § 40701(a),
108 Stat. 1902, 1953-55 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993))
(describing the petitioning procedure for battered aliens and the children of battered
aliens). For a discussion of the particular problems faced by battered immigrant
women prior to the enactment of the VAWA, see MichelleJ. Anderson, Note, A License
to Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J. 1401
(1993), which argues that the prior legal regime acted to keep immigrant women in
relationships with abusive citizen or legal-resident spouses upon pain of deportation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 13981. For a discussion of the political and legislative struggles in
enacting the civil rights remedy, see Panel Discussion, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy Implications & Litigation Strategy, 4J.L.
& POL'Y 383 (1996) [hereinafter Panel Discussion]; see also Nourse, supra note 2, at 8
(detailing the complete history of the VAWA from 1990 until its adoption, including
hearings, testimony, and changes made in committee); Patricia Schroeder, Stopping
Violence Against Women Still Takes a Fight: If in Doubt Just Look at the 104th Congress, 4J.L.
& POLY 377 (1996) (describing funding issues related to the VAWA); cf Siegel, supra
note 9, at 2198 (discussing the opposition to the civil rights remedy by the federal ju-
diciary).
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violence motivated by gender." 4 A woman who can prove all of the
elements of a crime of violence motivated by gender 5 may sue for
"compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory re-
lief."36 The VAWA also covers deprivations occurring "under color" of
state law. Congress intended that the VAWA remedy would supple-
ment the existing pantheon of federal civil rights causes of action,s
specifically, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,39 1983, 40 and 1985(3). ' Those sections
do not cover private gender-discriminatory violence against women
perpetrated by a single individual. Section 1983 requires state ac-
tion;42 § 1985(3) requires a conspiracy of two or more persons;43 and
-" 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a). This section provides:
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section
8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this part to protect the
civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public
safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a
Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated
by gender.
Id
See infra Part I.C.
s6 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c). This provision states:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of vio-
lence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in
subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action
for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and de-
claratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
Id.
Id See id. Note that the "under color of" language tracks the language in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; see also S. REP. No. 103-138, at 53 (1993) (explaining that the "under color of
law" language should be interpreted in the same manner as 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 50-53 (describing the VAWA as an "extension" of the
existing civil rights laws).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (providing for enforcement of equal rights for racial minori-
ties).
40 Id. § 1983 (providing a remedy when civil rights have been violated under color
of state law); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1960) (confirming that civil rights
violations performed under color of state law subject the violator to § 1983 liability
whether or not the violator was acting within the bounds of state law).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (providing a civil rights remedy to victims of private con-
spiracies for deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities).
12 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934 (1982) (stating that § 1983
requires state action because it is derived from the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 enacted to
enforce the 14th Amendment).
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 42 (1993) ("[Section] 1985 has
been largely unavailable to women for two reasons. First, it is an unsettled question
whether section 1985(3) applies to claims of sexual discrimination. Second, the stat-
103
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§ 1981 is limited to racial discrimination."
Although the language and purpose of the VAWA echo its Recon-
struction predecessors, the VAWA civil rights remedy is distinct be-
cause it creates a new substantive right-the right to be free from
"crimes of violence motivated by gender,"45 and the vehicle for en-
forcement of this right-the civil rights remedy." The VAWA civil
rights remedy represents the first time Congress has declared that vio-
lence against women is gender discrimination. The House Conference
Report, for example, states that "Congress has found that crimes of
violence motivated by gender constitute bias crimes in violation of the
victim's right to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender.""'
B. The Civil Rights Remedy Provides Key Advantages
over Existing State Laws
In addition to serving the important societal function" of recog-
nizing that violence against women is gender discrimination, the
VAWA remedy has distinct advantages over existing state laws. First,
the VAWA provides civil relief where the State refuses to prosecute
criminally because of the relationship between the victim and the
ute requires more than one perpetrator... leaving most gender-motivated crimes
against women unprotected."). For further discussion of the debate on whether
§ 1985(3) covers women, see infra Part III.E.
4 See, e.g., Bobo v. ITT, Continental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. Nov.
1981) (holding that § 1981 "applies only to race"). Section 1981 is widely assumed not
to cover sex discrimination. See generally id. at 344, nn.6-7 (listing 27 district court and
five court of appeals decisions concluding that "gender discrimination is not within
the acts forbidden by § 1981").
" 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
The basic structure of the statute is as follows: statement of purpose, declaration
of the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender, cause of action for
deprivation of the right, definition of crime of violence motivated by gender, and limi-
tations and procedure. See id. § 13981.
4 See Nourse, supra note 2, at 5 (characterizing the civil rights remedy as
"unprecedented"); Siegel, supra note 9, at 2197 (stating that the remedy "broke new
ground").
's H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); see also S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48
(1993) ("The Violence Against Women Act recognizes that gender discrimination may
take the form not only of a lost pay raise or promotion, but also a violent, criminal at-
tack.").
" See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 50 (declaring that the civil rights remedy "provid[es]
a special societal judgment that crimes motivated by gender bias are unacceptable be-
cause they violate the victims' civil rights"); see also Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Reme-
dies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAw & INEQ. J. 1, 44 (1992) ("The dis-
tinct advantage to civil rights causes of actions [sic], like criminal prosecutions, is that
violations constitute attacks on socially held norms of human decency, not individual
or 'private' harms.").
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perpetrator. ° For example, although nearly every state has abolished
the complete marital rape exemption, many states still prosecute rape
within marriage differently than rape outside marriage. Some states
only prosecute when the couple has separated or has begun divorce
proceedings;5' other states criminalize only first-degree rape, or rape
where force is used.52  Some states even have extended the marital
rape exemption to cover cohabitants., 3 Delaware has gone so far as to
exempt voluntary social companions from prosecution for rape unless
54there is additional serious injury.
Second, the VAWA provides a federal forum and cause of action
to plaintiffs who are precluded by state law from bringing a state civil
cause of action. Some states, for example, limit a wife's ability to sue
her husband for an intentional tort such as battery.55 Third, Congress
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988 so that a court can award reasonable at-
56tomey's fees to the prevailing party in a VAWA action. Finally, un-
0 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (d) (2) (B). According to Victoria Nourse, this provision was
added to counteract state statutes which downgrade violent crimes against women that
would be felonies but for the relationship between the perpetrator and victim. See
Nourse, supra note 2, at 28 ("[T]he drafters added language explicitly stating... the
'acts'... must be considered separate and apart from the relationship of the victim
and the perpetrator.").
"' See Robin West, Equality Theoy, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 Fl. L. REV. 45, 47-48 nn.9-10 (1990) (listing state statutes modifying
the marital rape exemption where the couple is separated or has begun proceedings).
52SeSee, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 47 (noting that some states fail to prosecute
marital rape unless the wife suffered "additional degrees of violence like kidnapping
or being threatened with a weapon," and that others refuse to prosecute when the wife
is "unconscious, drugged, asleep, ill, or physically or mentally helpless"); West, supra
note 51, at 46 n.6 (detailing 21 state statutes that criminalize only certain degrees or
types of sex crimes within marriage); cf.Jaye Sitton, Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles:
The "Marital" Rape Allowance 72 N.C. L. REV. 261 (1993) (arguing that although most
states have abolished the exemption by statute or by decision, the exemption is quali-
fied in many states, leaving married women without protection from some varieties of
sexual assault).
"s See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45 n.50 (1991) (commenting that some states have
extended marital rape rules to nonmarried cohabitants); see also West, supra note 51, at
48 n.11 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(b) (West 1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.010(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511 (1989); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-10 (Michie 1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (West 1983)).
51 SeeDEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, §§ 774-775 (1997).
See Panel Discussion, supa note 33, at 407 (statement of Betty Levinson)
(claiming that although many states have abolished interspousal immunity for inten-
tional torts, there have been few successful suits, and many such suits are precluded by
short statutes of limitation). The VAWA includes a four-year statute of limitation. See
28 U.S.C. § 1658.
SeeViolence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. 4, § 40303, 108
Stat. 1902, 1942 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988) (providing for the same award of attor-
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der the VAWA, a plaintiff may obtain a permanent injunctive order
forbidding a defendant from contacting her, whereas many state-law
orders of protection last only for a specified duration.
C. Elements of a Crime of Violence Motivated by Gender
To establish a cause of action under the civil rights remedy, a
plaintiff must prove that a defendant committed a "crime[] of vio-
lence motivated by gender."" A crime of violence motivated by gen-
der has two elements: First, it must rise to the level of a federal or
state felony that also would be a statutory crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 16;"' and second, it must be committed with gender-
motivated animus.6°
1. Crime of Violence
The VAWA focuses on the act committed by the perpetrator. A
plaintiff must prove that the perpetrator's conduct met the actus reus
elements of a felony against either a person or against property seri-
61
ous enough to be an 18 U.S.C. § 16 crime of violence. Some exam-
ney's fees for § 13981 actions as for §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3) and other civil rights
causes of action).
5 See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 406 (statement of Betty Levinson)
(explaining that in New York, family court orders of protection have a maximum life
of three years and criminal court orders last no more than five years after conviction).
8 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (a); seesupra note 34 (quoting this section of the VAWA).
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (c)-(d); 18 id. § 16(a). The VAWA defines a crime of vio-
lence as:
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or
that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a seri-
ous risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the mean-
ing of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title 18, whether or
not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or con-
viction and whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime,
territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in
subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes such
action and the individual against whom such action is taken.
42 id. § 13981 (d) (2).
' See 42 id. § 13981(d).
6' Section 16 defines a crime of violence as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substan-
tial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense.
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ples of felonies against persons in the federal criminal code that qual-
ify as crimes of violence are: aggravated sexual assault,12 child sexual
abuse, kidnapping, murder, and felonious assault. A felony against
property must both meet the 18 U.S.C. § 16 threshold and "present[]
a serious risk of physical injury to another" to form the basis for a
VAWA claim.6 The underlying felony, or "predicate offense,"6 may
be a state or federal felony.& The defendant need not have been
prosecuted or convicted of the underlying felony. 7
2. Gender-Motivated Animus
The VAWA defines the "motivated by gender" element of a
"crime of violence motivated by gender" as: "a crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least
in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."6 Congress mod-
eled this animus requirement on the "invidious class based animus"
requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) as interpreted in Griffin v. Breck-
enridge6 and its progeny. The VAWA language tracks language from
18 id. § 16 (emphasis added). Section 16(a) refers to misdemeanors or felonies that
specifically require the use or threat of force as a defining element of the offense, and
§ 16(b) refers to felonies that do not list force or threat of force as a required element,
but that, based on the act itself, assume there is a risk that force will be used.
According to Victoria Nourse, the Senate Judiciary Committee added the require-
ment that a gender-motivated crime meet the threshold of 18 U.S.C § 16 in 1990, in
response to Department of Justice concerns that the then-current version of the bill
did not define clearly a crime of violence. See Nourse, supra note 2, at 12. Once the
threshold was added, "[t]he new emphasis was on the 'acts' at issue-i.e. the actus reus
associated with a criminal offense. The question was categorical: whether the acts al-
leged fit within the category of offenses enumerated in section 16." Id. at 14 (citations
and footnote omitted).
62 "Aggravated sexual assault" is the federal-law equivalent to rape. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (defining aggravated sexual assault as causing another person to engage in
sexual acts by force, threat, or other means).
Of course, the "predicate offense" may also be a state-law felony. For an exam-
ple of a court's analysis of a state criminal statute in the context of the VAWA, see Doe
v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339, 1342-44 (8th Cir. 1998).
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (d) (2) (A); see also S. REP. No. 103-138, at52 (1993).
62 Doev. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339, 1342 (8th Cir. 1998).
See42 U.S.C. § 13981(d) (2) (A).
67 See id. § 13981(d); id. § 13981(e) (2) ("Nothing in this section requires a prior
criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of
action under subsection (c) of this section."); see also Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608,
611-12 (D. Conn. 1996) ("The statute does not require a prior criminal complaint,
prosecution, or conviction to establish the elements of the cause of action.")
42 U.S.C. § 13981(d) (emphasis added).
69 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (requiring an "invidiously discriminatory animus behind
the conspirators' action [s]" for a § 1985 (3) cause of action).
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an equal protection case, Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,7 imported
into the proof requirements for a § 1985(3) claim by the Court in
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clini. 7 The animus requirement
was inserted to prevent the VAWA remedy from converting every vio-
lent crime committed against a woman into a federal tort claim.7 To
this end, the Senate clearly stated that "random" crimes are excluded
from coverage by the VAWA civil rights remedy.73
The 1993 Senate Report explaining the addition of the animus
requirement defined animus as "a specific intent or purpose, based
on the victim's gender, to injure the victim." 75 The Report divided
gender-motivated animus into two parts: First, the violent act must be
"committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,"76 and sec-
ond, the violent act must be "due, at least in part, to an animus based
on the victim's gender."77 The Senate Report gives the following ex-
ample of how this two-part test should be applied: A man goes on a
shooting spree in a department store, shoots only women, and yells "I
hate women." The fact that he shot only women is evidence that he is
motivated by gender, and his comment is evidence of his animus. 78 In
70 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (defining "discriminatory purpose" in the equal pro-
tection context).
71 506 U.S. 263, 271-72 (1993) ("'"Discriminatory purpose"..., implies that the
decisionmaker... selected... a particular course of action at least in part "because of, "
not merely "in spite of, "its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.' The same princi-
ple applies to the 'class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus' requirement of
§ 1985(3)." (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added) (second omission in
original) (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279)).
72 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993) ("Congress does not create a 'Federal tort
law' when it legislates a civil rights remedy for violent acts based on discriminatory mo-
tivation." (citing Gnffin, 403 U.S. at 102)).
71 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at48 (1991).
74 Nourse explains that the animus requirement as enacted represented a com-
promise between a "malice" or "animosity" standard requiring "proof that the defen-
dant ... hated all members of the opposite sex or consciously intended to use violence
as a message of gender hatred" and a "disparate impact" standard requiring only proof
that the particular act in question "disproportionately affected women." Nourse, supra
note 2, at 29-30.
75 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 64.
76 Id. at 50.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 51 (setting forth this example and explaining the kind of evidence
needed to prove animus). Senator Orrin Hatch provides an absurd articulation of the
distinction that reveals a misunderstanding of rape:
"Say you have a man who believes a woman is attractive .... [H]e's so moti-
vated ... that he rips her clothes off and has sex with her against her will.
Now let's say you have another man who grabs a woman off some lonely road
and in the process of raping her says words like... 'You're a woman! I hate
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practical terms, it is difficult to distinguish between motivation and
animus.
Some commentators have argued for a broad interpretation of
the animus standard. Victoria Nourse explains that animus means
"purpose":
Consciousness of bias is not required: a plaintiff states a
claim.., if... she can show that the crime or victim was purposefully
chosen because of "the victim's gender." That includes acts used to en-
force, by violence, stereotypical gender-roles, to punish the victim for
the exercise of rights guaranteed to all citizens, or to use forced sex as a
weapon of intimidation or degradation.7
Nourse's definition includes more than the obvious case of the
screaming department-store shooter; it encompasses violence moti-
vated by gender in other ways, such as the violent perpetuation of
outdated stereotypes of women. In each VAWA case, it is a question
of fact whether a particular perpetrator committed the crime of vio-
lence with gender-motivated animus."
D. The VAWA as a Modern Version of the Reconstruction-Era
Civil Rights Acts
Congress conceived of the VAWA as the modem-day gender ver-
sion"' of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, s2 which included the precursors
to both 42 U.S.C. § 1983, premised on the Fourteenth Amendment,
and § 1985(3), premised on the Thirteenth Amendment.3 Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in reaction to rampant violence
women!' .... Now, the first one's terrible. But the other's much worse. If a
man rapes a woman while telling her he loves her, that's a far cry from saying
he hates her... ."
Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, NEw REPUB11C,July 12, 1993, at 12, 15 (quoting Senator
Hatch). For an argument that Senator Hatch's statement reflects a view that animus
requires actual malice, see Siegel, supra note 9, at 2200.
"Nourse, supra note 2, at 31.
See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 50 (stating that proof on a case-by-case basis is re-
quired).
", See id. at 48 (introducing the new civil rights remedy by stating that "[o]ver a
century ago, society declared that it would not tolerate attacks against persons because
of their race, religion, or national origin. Congress passed the first civil rights laws
barring such discrimination in 1871."). The Senate also placed the VAWA in the con-
text of recent federal legislation outlawing hate crimes that did not even mention
crimes motivated by gender. See id. ("More recent legislation has not filled the
'gender gap' left by traditional anti-bias crime laws.").
82 The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch.22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994)).
See supra notes 40-41; infra Part III.E.
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against African-Americans in the South after the Civil War.8 Just as
Congress in the 1870s gathered evidence concerning racial violence
and enacted the 1871 Act, Congress in the 1990s gathered evidence
concerning gender-motivated violence against women,85 and enacted
the VAWA civil rights remedy.
In 1871, Congress decided that a federal remedy was needed for
African-Americans whose rights were being denied by private citizens
and by the state because: (1) state law did not exist to address the
problem; (2) state-law remedies were inadequate; and (3) the state
laws that did exist were not being enforced equally, or at all.8' In
1994, as the next three sections will demonstrate, Congress enacted
the VAWA for the same reasons.
1. Congress Gathered Evidence That Violence Against Women
Is Widespread
8 7
Hearing testimony revealed,8s and the Senate Committee Reports
concluded, that violence against women is widespread. The Senate found
that " [v]iolence is the leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to
44, more common than automobile accidents, muggings and cancer
84 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. De-
partment of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monroe stated:
This Act of April 20, 1871 ... was passed by a Congress that had the Klan
'particularly in mind.' The debates are replete with references to the lawless
conditions existing in the South in 1871. There was available to the Congress
during these debates a report, nearly 600 pages in length, dealing with the ac-
tivities of the Klan and the inability of the state governments to cope with it.
This report was drawn on by many of the speakers.
Id.
, In the early 1990s, three hearings were held concerning the first iteration of the
VAWA civil rights remedy, Senate Bill 2754. These hearings addressed the prevalence
of violent crimes against women and the barriers women faced in obtaining justice.
For details of the hearings held and resulting changes in the legislation, see Nourse,
supra note 2.
86 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-75 (discussing the legislative history of§ 1983).
8' This section relies heavily on the use of the statistics appearing in the Senate
and House reports preceding the passage of the VAWA. I use the statistics to demon-
strate the scope of evidence available to Congress. I hope that the sheer volume of
statistics will not, as Martha Minow has argued, enable the reader to disengage with
the problem of violence against women. See Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the
Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1685 (1990)
("The language used to describe individual stories may create a sense of drama and
urgency, yet it hides the scope of the problem; the language of trends and populations
may cover the scope, but it undermines the sense of personal connection and individ-
ual obligation to effectuate change.").
88 See supra note 85 (detailing hearings held on the VAWA).
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deaths combined."8 Violence is perpetrated upon women by people they love.
In 1989, three to four million women were abused by their hus-
bands." The U.S. Department of'Justice estimated that from 1992 to
1993, seventy-five percent of all violence perpetrated against women
by a "lone offender" was by someone the woman knew, twenty-nine
percent of all "lone-offender" violence was committed by an ex- or
current husband or lover.9 Intimate violence is serious. "As many as 20
percent of hospital emergency room cases are related to wife batter-
ing."92 The Department of Justice estimated that if all domestic at-
tacks were reported, one-third would qualify as "felony rape, robbery,
or aggravated assault." 3 One in six sexual assaults a week is commit-
ted by a family member.94 Intimate violence is deadly. "[F]amily vio-
lence accounts for a significant number of murders in this country.
One-third of all women who are murdered die at the hands of a hus-
band or boyfriend."95 Violence against young women is also increasing. In
1990, the Senate found that young women were being attacked at
twice the rate they had been in 1974, while young men were being at-
tacked twelve percent less frequently.96
2. Congress Found That Either State Law Did Not Address the
Problem or Remedies Were Inadequate
The Senate concluded that there were inadequate remedies at
state and local law. The Senate Report cites seventeen studies com-
missioned by various state court task forces and bar associations that
89 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993). In 1994, there was one rape for every 270
women. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTICE, FEMALE
VICrIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME (1996).
See S. REP. No. 101-545, at30 (1990).
", See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2172 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED
SURVEY 1 (1995) [hereinafter FSTIMATES]); see also BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUsTIcE, SEX DIFFERENCES IN VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION, 1994, at 5 (1997)
("Among female victims, friends or acquaintances committed 40% of the rapes and
sexual assaults; strangers, 32%; and intimates, 24%.").
9" S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 37.
S. REP. No. 102-197, at 38 (1991); see S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41 (same).
SeeS. REP. No. 103-138, at 38.
95 id. at 41; see also ESTIMATES, supra note 91, at 4 ("In 1992 approximately 28% of
female victims of homicide (1,414 women) were known to have been killed by their
husband, ex-husband, or boyfriend.").
See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 31; see also ESTIMATES, supra note 91, at 4 ("Women
age 12 to 18 were more likely than women older than 18 to report violence against
them by friends or acquaintances.").
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found that crimes against women are treated less seriously than other
violent crimes.97 In addition, when defendants do get convicted, their
sentences are short. The Senate found that almost twenty-five per-
cent of convicted rapists served no time and that an additional twenty-
five percent were sentenced to "local jails where the average sentence
is 11 months."98 In many cases, a woman who has been raped or as-
saulted receives no compensation for her injuries. Suits for inten-
tional torts within marriage are barred to some degree in nine states.
3. Congress Found That There Was Uneven Enforcement
of Existing Laws
The Senate concluded that "crimes against women are often
treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. Police may
refuse to take reports; prosecutors may encourage defendants to
plead to minor offenses; judges may rule against victims on eviden-
tiary matters .... 100 In the case of sexual assault, "[a] t every step of
the way, the criminal justice system poses significant hurdles for vic-
tims."
1' 0
The Senate found that police are not doing their job when it
comes to protecting women from violence. The Senate Report cites a
1989 study done in Washington, D.C., which demonstrated that po-
lice failed to arrest batterers in "over 85 percent of the family violence
cases where a woman was found bleeding from wounds. " 10 2 Many
other studies found similar results-demonstrating that police fail to
answer calls, write reports, and make arrests.0 3
A woman's difficulties do not end once an arrest is made. The
Senate cited several state studies documenting the effects on women
97 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 n.52 (listing studies that have "concluded that
crimes disproportionately affecting women are often treated less seriously than com-
parable crimes affecting men").
Id. at 38.
See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2163 n.163 (describing how different states treat the
doctrine ofinterspousal tort immunity).
'0 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42.
101 Id.
10 Id. at 41.
'os See Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitu-
tion Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 788 n.3 (1986) (providing a list
of relevant studies); see also Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 403 n.17 (statement of
Betty Levinson) (citing a study that found that only 25% to 30% of domestic violence
calls to police in New York City resulted in the written reports that are mandated by
law).
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of gender bias in the courts. In one case, a judge in Georgia
"reported that one of his colleagues, in a case of repeated domestic
abuse, 'mocked' ... the victim and 'led the courtroom in laughter as
the woman left .... ' Subsequently, the woman was killed by her es-
tranged husband." 4 In another case, a Maryland judge "stated in
court that he didn't believe anything that the abuse victim was saying
'because I don't believe anything like this could happen to me. ''" 5 In
Connecticut, a prosecutor demanded of a fifteen-year-old rape victim
in court: "Come on, you can tell me. You're probably just worried
that your boyfriend got you pregnant, right? Isn't that why you're say-
ing he raped you?""6 In Florida, a state judge jailed a rape victim
when the victim recanted her prior accusation because she felt pres-
sure from her ex-boyfriend and his family who were in the court-
107room.
At the 1990 hearings, Sarah M. Buel, an assistant district attorney
from Massachusetts, testified about the difficulty of prosecuting and
obtaining a conviction in a rape case in which the parties had a rela-
tionship:
I can try two cases back-to-back. If it is a stranger assault, I have no trou-
ble getting the maximum, absolutely none. I get the married couple in
there and the judge wants to talk about, "Now, are you sure you don't
want to go to marriage counseling..." and just complete denial about
her danger. I am terrified for her life, and the judge wants to talk about
this illusion of mom, pop, bud, sis, and dog Spot ....108
Buel stated that in a drug case, if the perpetrator goes to the
home of a witness and makes threats before trial, an arrest or an
added offense often results. In a domestic violence case, a perpetra-
tor's threats to the victim before trial often go unpunished.'00 The
civil rights remedy of the VAWA was Congress's response to the evi-
dence it collected concerning the seriousness of violence against
women, the lack of or inadequacy of existing state remedies, and the
unequal enforcement of the remedies that did exist.
'0' S. REP. No. 102-197, at34 (1991).
,03 Id.
106 Id.
107 See Christina Cheakalos, "I Wanted Her to Think... and Tell the Truth," MIAIL
HERALD, July 31, 1989, at IA (recounting how the judge put the woman in jail for a
night).
' Nourse, supra note 2, at 11 (citing Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciary, 101st Cong. 163-64 (1990) (testimony of Sarah M. Buel)).
00 See id. at 10 n.57.
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E. Congressional Authority to Enact the VAWA
Congress purported to act pursuant to its powers under the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
enacting the VAWA civil rights remedy."'
1. The Commerce Clause
Congress claimed that the Commerce Clause provided one source
of authority to enact the VAWA civil rights remedy. The VAWA was
passed before the landmark 1995 Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Lopez"'-the first time in nearly sixty years that the Court re-
jected a congressional assertion of power under the Commerce
Clause.1 2 Therefore, the VAWA's legislative history reflects a pre-
Lopez understanding of the Commerce Clause power. Namely,
"[t] he court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated ac-
tivity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such
a finding."'
1 4
During the VAWA hearings, Congress heard a significant amount
of testimony regarding the link between gender discrimination in the
form of violence and interstate commerce. In response to this testi-
mony, Congress found, for example, that "crimes of violence moti-
vated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate com-
merce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from
engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting
business.., in interstate commerce."15 The Senate found that vio-
lence against some women "restricts movement [and] reduces em-
ployment opportunities"' 6 for those women, and "increases [overall]
"0 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54-55 (1993);S. REP. No. 102-197, at 52-54.
. 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
n2 See Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("Congress's free-
dom under the Commerce Clause was restricted for the first time in almost sixty years
by the Supreme Court in [Lopez].").
"3 See Nourse, supra note 2, at 18 (describing testimony of experts claiming that
the VAWA would "easily pass constitutional scrutiny"); see, e.g., Violence Against Women:
Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciar, 102d Cong.
113-17 (1991) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Cass Sunstein, Professor of Law,
University of Chicago Law School).
"' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (emphasis added). Many courts are still applying the Hodel test post-Lopez See
cases cited infra note 260.
"' H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
"6 S. REP. NO. 103-138, at54 (1993).
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health expenditures, and reduces consumer spending."117 The Senate
Report cited a study that found that nearly fifty percent of rape vic-
tims quit or lost their jobs after the rape."" In addition, the Senate,
citing statistics indicating that homicide is the number one cause of
death for women who die on the job,"9 determined that fear of dis-
criminatory violence "affects the economy because it deters women
from taking jobs in certain areas or at certain hours that pose a sig-
nificant risk of such violence."'
Congress concluded that its findings were sufficient to meet "the
modest threshold required by the Commerce Clause."'2 ' Lopez later
raised this threshold. The effect of Lopez on the VAWA is discussed
below in Part II.A.4.
2. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress also invoked its power under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment as authority for the civil rights remedy1ss The
Senate Judiciary Committee declared that "gender-motivated
crimes.., threaten women's equal protection of the laws." '23 As sup-
port for congressional authority to enact a private remedy to address
public discrimination, the Senate Report cited Katzenbach v. Morgan
24
and District of Columbia v. Carter.1s The Senate Report proclaimed
117 id.
118 See id.
See id. at 54 n.70.
'2 Id. at 54.
121 Id.
'2 See id. at 54-55.
'2 Id. at 55.
124 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Katzenbach held that section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act
is within Congress's power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. See id. at 668.
According to Professor Cass Sunstein, there are two possible interpretations of
Katzenbach that would support Congress's power to enact the VAWA civil rights rem-
edy. The radical view, never accepted by a clear majority of the Court, is that
"Congress could actually conclude that a practice violated the fourteenth amendment
even if the Court disagreed and having so concluded ..... Congress can actually define
the content of the equal protection clause." Hearing, supra note 113, at 118 (statement
of Professor Cass Sunstein). The less sweeping interpretation, as modified by City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), is that Congress may "provide remedies" for
14th Amendment violations even when the remedies also reach activities that "do not
violate the Constitution." Hearing, supra note 113, at 119 (statement of Professor Cass
Sunstein).
i2 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8 (1973) ("This is not to say, of course, that Congress may
not proscribe purely private conduct under § five of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
For another view of Congress's authority to reach private action, see United Brotherhood
11151998]
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that these cases established that "[w]hile the 14th Amendment itself
only covers actions by the States, Congress's power to enforce the
amendment includes the power to create a private remedy as the
most effective means to fight public discrimination. According to
the Katzenbach theory, Congress's target is the equal protection viola-
tion wrought by state and local governments that refuse to treat vio-
lence against women the same way that they treat other crimes of vio-
lence.12' The civil rights remedy is the vehicle for enforcement of
deprivation of equal protection by gender-motivated crimes. Profes-
sor Cass Sunstein testified before Congress that the Katzenbach theory
makes irrelevant the issue of whether Congress may address private
action via the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 8
II. CHALLENGES TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: STATE ACTION, PRIVACY, FEDERALISM, AND LOPEZ
The VAWA civil rights remedy has been extremely controversial.'1
9
From its introduction to congressional debate to constitutional chal-
lenges in district courts, arguments opposing the civil rights remedy
have fallen into three categories: state action, privacy, and federal-
ism. After Lopez, a fourth objection arose: the VAWA oversteps the
reestablished boundaries of Commerce Clause power.
of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 842 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Congress had authority to reach private conduct by virtue of its power to protect the
rights of national citizenship.").
126 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55 n.72.
'27 Professor Cass Sunstein described the theory as follows:
Congress could say that it is seeking to remedy what would clearly be a consti-
tutional violation under the Supreme Court's own decisions. Such a violation
consists of bias or discrimination in the administration of the criminal justice
system-in the form of a refusal to deal adequately with crimes against
women, in part because the victims in the relevant cases are women.
Hearing, supra note 113, at 121 (statement of Professor Cass Sunstein); see also Robin
West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV.
111, 146-47 (1991) (arguing that one of the fundamental rights of national citizenship
is the right to be free from private violence, and that a state breaches its equal protec-
tion guarantee when it fails to protect victims from private violence).
128 Sunstein stated:
Congress is responding to an equal protection problem in the administration
of state and local law by state and local governmental authorities. It is not re-
sponding to private acts at all-no more than the equal protection clause it-
self does so by requiring states to protect blacks as well as whites from private
violence.
Hearing, supra note 113, at 122-23 (statement of Professor Cass Sunstein).
129 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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To date, there have been six reported' 3° constitutional challenges
to the VAWA civil fights remedy: Doe v. Doe,'13 Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic & State University,
i32 Doe v. Hartz," Seaton v. Seaton,34
Anisimov v. Lake,15 and Crisonino v. New York City Housing Authority.
3 6
In each case, the defendant(s) challenged Congress's power to enact
the civil rights remedy under the Commerce Clause and/or Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment."7
A. Arguments Against the Civil Rights Remedy
1. State Action Arguments
There are legitimate state action arguments against the civil rights
remedy notwithstanding Congress's claim that it had authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a private remedy
for public discrimination. In recent years, the Supreme Court stead-
fastly has supported the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires affirmative state action.iss This position is illustrated most
clearly in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, in
which the Court held that Wisconsin's failure to intervene in a case of
known and ongoing child abuse was not a violation of the child's lib-
erty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'9
Although DeShaney involved the Due Process Clause and the VAWA
relies on the Equal Protection Clause, the Court might approach a
,so See also Mattison v. Click Corp. of Am., Civ. A. No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 WL 32597
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998) (mem.) (upholding the VAWA and citing the cases discussed
in this section).
. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
112 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en
banc granted and opinion vacated WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at B3 (4th Cir. Feb. 5,
1998).
'" 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd in part and vacated in part on other
grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998).
"4 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997). The Seaton case was later dismissed with-
out prejudice before trial when the plaintiffs failed to file a pretrial order. See Randy
Kenner, Judge Dismisses Seaton Suit, Cites Routed Timeliness Rules, KNOXVILLE NEWS-
SENTINEL,Jan. 13, 1998, atA4, available in 1998 WL 8570550.
982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
" 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
,17 Congress explicitly predicated the passage of the VAWA on its 14th Amend-
ment and Commerce Clause powers. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (a) (1994); S. REP. No. 102-
197, at 52 (1991).
'33 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (establishing that the 14th
Amendment requires state action).
,' 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
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Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the VAWA in a similar man-
140ner.
The facts in DeShaney are extreme. Four-year-old Joshua
DeShaney arrived in an emergency room with suspicious bruises. The
Wisconsin Department of Social Services took Joshua into temporary
custody, but later returned him to his father. Over the course of the
next six months, Joshua returned to the emergency room twice. In
addition, a caseworker visited his home on multiple occasions, noting
bruises and marks on his body. The State nevertheless took no fur-
ther action. Ultimately, Mr. DeShaney beat Joshua's head so severely
that the child fell into a coma, and was left permanently and severely
retarded.'
41
In denying recovery to Joshua, the Court explained that the Due
Process Clause does not "require[] the State to protect the life, lib-
erty, and property of its citizens against invasions by private actors."'
4
The Court further cautioned:
[I] t is well to remember once again that the harm was inflicted not by the
State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua's father. The most that can be said of the
state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did nothing
when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them ....
The people of Wisconsin .... should not have [liability] thrust
upon them by this Court's expansion of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.14
With this language, the Court limited the scope of the state action
doctrine for Fourteenth Amendment purposes to affirmative acts by
state actors, irrespective of how Wisconsin's failure to act leftJoshua's
father unhindered to commit violence against his son.'" The Court
refused to acknowledge that the State's failure to intervene allowed
1' See infra text accompanying notes 146-47 (describing the effect of DeShaney on
§ 1983 cases brought on equal protection grounds against police departments for
their failure to protect victims of domestic violence).
"' See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191-93 (detailing the tragic sequence of events).
142 Id. at 195.
143 Id. at 203 (emphasis added). Compare this language with Judge Kiser's lan-
guage in Brzonkala: "Certainly the state is not responsible in any relevant sense for in-
dividuals who commit violent crimes against women." Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytech-
nic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 797 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir.
1997), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at B3 (4th
Cir. Feb. 5, 1998).
144 See Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and
Family Violence 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1668-70 (1990) (describing the dissent's posi-
tion and arguing that in DeShaney, the State committed "violations through complic-
ity").
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Mr. DeShaney to beat Joshua nearly to death. " 5 Given its position
that state action must be affirmative, it seems unlikely that the Court
would uphold, under a Fourteenth Amendment theory, a statute like
the VAWA that provides a remedy for privately inflicted violence.
Indeed, since DeShaney, it has become increasingly difficult for
survivors of domestic violence to sue local governments under
§ 1983116 for failure to protect them from battering.47 Lower courts
even have held that equal protection claims, in which, for example, a
local police department has a different arrest policy for family vio-
lence and street violence, are barred by DeShaney. For example, in
McKee v. City of Rockwall, the Fifth Circuit relied on DeShaney to deny
recovery on equal protection grounds to a woman whose boyfriend
injured her after the police refused to arrest him.
14
1
2. Marital Privacy Arguments
The ideal of marital or familial privacy forms a conceptual bul-
wark against a legal remedy for gender-motivated violence when the
parties share a familial or intimate relationship. The VAWA covers a
full spectrum of violence against women, ranging from one-time
stranger assaults, to date rape, to child sexual abuse lasting one year,
to familial violence lasting over two decades.1 9 The VAWA's goal is to
counteract a legal system that refused to interfere with violence oc-
curring within the private familial sphere. The statute was designed
to help victims combat:
'4 See id. at 1666 ("Joshua's father's violence putJoshua into a coma and left him
paralyzed and without the functioning of half of his brain. The doctors found pools of
rotted blood inside his brain as the result of months of bleeding from repeated as-
sault").
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing a civil rights remedy when a person's
constitutional or statutory rights have been violated by government officials).
"1 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973, 986
n.56 (1991) ("Courts are rejecting [§ 1983] substantive due process claims, which are
typically based on the alleged existence of a 'special relationship' between the victims
and the State ... as incompatible with DeShaney."); cf Laura S. Harper, Note, Battered
Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Department of Social Services, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1393, 1393-94 (1990)
(arguing that an equal protection claim, even with the higher standard of discrimina-
tory intent, may be more fruitful than a due process claim).
i' 877 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to "permit plaintiffs to circumvent
the rule of DeShaney by converting every Due Process claim into an Equal Protection
claim"); Harper, supra note 147, at 1411-13 (discussing McKee in reference to the
DeShaney decision).
"9 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (defining a crime of violence moti-
vated by gender).
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[a] law veiled by the idea of the relationship, a law that perceived
"marital disputes" where there were felonies; that refused to see force as
force as long as it was tied to an acquaintance; that believed that there
was something "personal" about rape when perpetrated by a husband;
that said that violence was chosen by choosing a relationship.
Accordingly, the VAWA represents a direct threat to a system of law
bounded by privacy because it declares that private violence is a pub-
lic act: gender discrimination.'51
Throughout most of the twentieth century, violence against
women inflicted by their husbands, including physical assault and
rape, has been labeled "private." The perpetrators of such violence
have been granted complete or partial immunity from prosecution. 52
Marital privacy has provided a justification for not arresting, for not
criminally prosecuting, and for reducing the punishments of men
who beat, maim, assault, and rape their intimate partners.15s For ex-
ample, the current version of the Model Penal Code still contains a
marital rape exemption because, according to its drafters, "the law of
rape, if applied to spouses, would thrust the prospect of criminal
sanctions into the ongoing process of adjustment in the marital rela-
tionship."
54
Feminist scholars criticize this conception of privacy, arguing that,
although the distinctions between the private and the public, or be-
tween the home and the marketplace, appear "natural," they are
150 Nourse, supra note 2, at 3-4.
"' See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No. 102-197, at 37
(1991). The Senate report stated:
Our country has an unfortunate blind spot when it comes to certain crimes
against women. Historically, crimes against women have been perceived as
anything but crime-as a "family" problem, as a "private" matter, as sexual
.miscommunication." That tradition of ambivalence has led to oxymoronic
labels such as "date rape," and "domestic violence," both of which suggest that
the violence described is somehow less violent or less harmful or less serious if
it takes place in a social setting or at home. Until we name a problem, we
cannot hope to see it for what it is. And until we name all violence against
women as crime, it will be seen neither as violence nor as crime.
Id.
I152 See Schneider, supra note 147, at 974 ("The concept of freedom from state in-
trusion into the marital bedroom takes on a different meaning when it is violence that
goes on in the marital bedroom. The concept of marital privacy, established as a con-
stitutional principal in Griswold, historically has been the key ideological rationale for
state refusal to intervene to protect battered women within ongoing intimate relation-
ships." (citations omitted)).
153 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2170-74 (detailing the relationship between privacy
and the legal response to violence against women).
,' MODELPENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (1980).
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really just normative conclusions. They claim the choice between
what is private and what is public is a political one, serving only to
protect male privilege. 55 When the State fails to arrest or punish the
perpetrator of a violent crime against a woman, the offender is em-
powered by implicit state sanction to continue his abusive behavior.
The victim is left with only extralegal options.'55 Thus, the doctrine of
privacy removes the law from a woman's reach and her home.
57
In her work on the marital rape exemption, Robin West explains
the differences between feminist and judicial constructs of privacy as
follows:
The obstacles to women's equal participation in public life ... are so
thoroughly ingrained in our societal habits, institutions, and thought
patterns that they appear not as obstacles to equality, but as the essence
of private life .... The bottom line is that the same reality experienced
by the raped wife as a daily ritual of violence, abuse, and horror strikes
the feminist as unconscionable state passivity in the face of private sub-
ordination and strikes the feminist lawyer as the denial of equal protec-
tion. But it conceivably appears to the Court as a[n] "important" or




s See Schneider, supra note 147, at 977 ("[S]elective application of law invokes
'privacy' as a rationale for immunity in order to protect male domination."). For a
parallel critique in the context of racial discrimination, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
"Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1991) ("The state action
framework supports the supremacy of ensconced interests-usually white-by placing
the burden on the person challenging the 'common sense' public-private distinc-
tions ....").
1'6 See Schneider, supra note 147, at 977 ("[W]hen the police do not respond to a
battered woman's call for assistance, or when a civil court refuses to evict her assailant,
the woman is relegated to self-help .... "). The impact of societal choices favoring
males is demonstrated in three telling stories described by Elizabeth Schneider. In
each case, a pregnant woman who sought help because her parmer had abused her
ended up being charged with criminal child abuse for alcohol or substance abuse dur-
ing pregnancy. The batterers were never prosecuted. Seeid. at 977 n.17.
's7 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 11, at 156 ("The message of women's inferior-
ity is compounded by the totality of the law's absence from the private realm. In our
society, law is for business and other important things. The fact that the law in general
has so little bearing on women's day-to-day concerns reflects and underscores their
insignificance.").
' West, supra note 51, at 67. Schneider also discusses how the concept of privacy
sometimes fosters violence against women:
Privacy says that violence against women is immune from sanction, that it is
permitted, acceptable and part of the basic fabric of American family life.
Privacy says that what goes on in the violent relationship should not be the
subject of state or community intervention. Privacy says that it is an individ-
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Adding to the apparent logic of the privacy doctrine are its deep
historical roots. Reva Siegel argues that the current regime of
"privacy" resulted from the breakdown of the prior legal system of
common-law marriage known as coverture."9 Under coverture, a
woman merged with her husband upon marriage and therefore le-
gally disappeared; by law, the husband "acquired rights to his wife's
person, the value of her paid and unpaid labor, and most property
she brought into the marriage."' 60 Wives were unable to sue in their
own names, husbands were answerable for their wives' torts, and, as a
result, husbands gained the right to chastise their wives.161 Siegel ar-
gues that the characterization of wife abuse as "private" is simply a
"preservation through transformation" 162 of the common-law marital
prerogative of chastisement. When the doctrine of chastisement was
repudiated during the Reconstruction Era, judges began to substitute
marital privacy for the right of chastisement, reaching identical re-
sults in the few wife abuse cases that were even brought to court.'63
Siegel argues that the codification of privacy reached its apotheosis in
the twentieth century as wife abuse was decriminalized by channeling
domestic cases through family courts that emphasize reconciliation
over criminal punishment.164 Siegel's thesis is also reflected in the
other original common-law incidents that have been reestablished via
privacy: interspousal immunity for torts, refusal to honor premarital
contracts other than those involving real property (inability to make
or enforce contracts), and support agreements that do not reflect the
ual, and not a systemic problem. Privacy operates as a mask for inequality,
protecting male violence against women.
Schneider, supra note 147, at 984-85.
"9 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2119, 2121-74 ("[A]s the nineteenth-century feminist
movement protested a husband's marital prerogatives [under coverture], the move-
ment helped bring about the repudiation of chastisement doctrine; but, in so doing,
the movement also precipitated changes in the regulation of marital violence that
'modernized' this body of... law.").
"o Id. at 2122.
See id. at 2123-25 (summarizing pre-late-19th-century legal relationships be-
tween husbands and wives).
112 Id. at 2119. In defining "preservation through transformation," Siegel explains:
"When the legitimacy of a status regime is successfully contested, lawmakers andjurists
will both cede and defend status privileges--gradually relinquishing the original rules
andjustificatory rhetoric of the contested regime and finding new rules and reasons to
protect such status privileges as they choose to defend...." Id.
lbS See id. at 2129-30 ("[Ilt would be misleading to look to the repudiation of chas-
tisement doctrine as an indicator of how the legal system responded to marital vio-
lence.").
14 See id. at 2170 ("[Bly the 1920s, most major cities had [domestic relations]
courts.").
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value of domestic work added to the partnership by the woman
(reflecting the common-law idea that the man was entitled to his
wife's domestic services) .'6
Privacy no longer functions as an absolute bar to justice for women
who are harmed by their fathers, brothers, husbands, and lovers. The
women's movement, the battered women's movement, and the rape-
crisis movement have made violence against women more public.
Many states have tempered the total marital rape exemption,' 6 en-
acted mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence cases, created
civil protection order procedures for victims, increased criminal
prosecutions for domestic violence, and funded shelters. 67 The
VAWA represents an important shift in paradigm at the congressional
level-from private violence to public gender discrimination.' The
newness and incompleteness of that shift, however, leaves the VAWA
vulnerable to attack under the prior paradigm of privacy; it may also
pave the way for an interpretation of the VAWA that would yield the
same result as under the prior regime. 69
3. Federalism Arguments
The federal and state judiciaries actively opposed the earliest ver-
sions of the VAWA civil rights remedy, couching their objections in
terms of federalism concerns and already overcrowded dockets.' 70 In
1991, the Conference of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts op-
posed the proposed civil rights remedy because it would cause "state-
16 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 11, at 155 (noting that the "same result was
previouslyjustified by legal fictions, such as the woman's civil death on marriage").
"6 See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
167 See Schneider, supra note 147, at 980-86 (detailing recent beneficial develop-
ments for victims of domestic violence).
161 See Nourse, supra note 2, at 3-5 (drawing a comparison with the paradigm shift
in race relations); Siegel, supra note 9, at 2197 (stating that the civil rights remedy
"analyzed violence against women as a form of sex discrimination").
169 See supra note 162 (explaining Siegel's concept of "preservation through trans-
formation").
170 Although many early objections were met by changes in the wording of the bill,
see Nourse, supra note 2, at 27-33 (detailing changes in the 1993 version of the VAWA,
including procedural changes made to counter the federalism objections of the fed-
eral and state judiciaries), it is instructive to repeat the objections here because of
their logical resonance and the possibility that they could resurface on appeal.
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federal jurisdictional problems and disruptions in the processing of
domestic relations cases in state courts."
1 7'
The Judicial Conference of the United States opposed the remedy
for fear of an onslaught of cases.'1 In his 1991 year-end report, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist singled out the VAWA civil rights remedy as
a new, unwarranted burden on the federal judiciary.'3 The ChiefJus-
tice presented his objections to the VAWA by analogizing the federal
judiciary to a water-starved western city grown beyond its resources
and urging "self-restraint in adding new federal causes of action."'7 4
The Chief Justice continued: "New additions should not be made un-
less critical to meeting important national interests which cannot
otherwise be satisfactorily addressed through nonjudicial forums, al-
ternative dispute resolution techniques, or the state courts."'75 He
identified the VAWA as a "new private right of action so sweeping,
that it could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic re-
lations disputes.'
76
Federalism objections to the VAWA are fueled by the ideology of
privacy'77 and draw legitimacy from a historic "domestic relations ex-
ception" that excludes alimony, divorce, and child custody cases from
diversity jurisdiction. '78 According to Professor Naomi Cahn, the do-
mestic relations exception is itself a product of the ideology of pri-
vacy-of "the outmoded dichotomy between a public sphere (the
marketplace, federal courts) and a private sphere (the family, the
state courts),,179
'7' See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2198 (quoting Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. 80 (1993)).
172 SeeSiegel, supra note 9, at 2198.
173 See William H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 138




7 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2201 ("Federalism objections to the civil rights rem-
edy acquire persuasive power as they draw on the traditional modes of reasoning
about intimate assault.").
'78 See Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV.
1073, 1073 (1994) ("[T]here has developed both a legislative andjudge-made Domes-
tic Relations Exception, precluding federal courts from hearing divorce, alimony, and
child custody cases." (emphasis added)). The domestic relations exception does not
preclude federal courts from hearing all "diversity cases that could be deemed domes-
tic relations cases. When such cases involve other areas of the law, such as tort or con-
tract, the cases will proceed." Id. at 1075.
1"9 Id. at 1101. Cahn continues:
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Cahn argues that the domestic relations exception enables fed-
eral courts to invoke "federalism" to screen out cases requiring a
court to examine relationships between family members.8 Cahn
maintains that although federal courts routinely hear cases in which
women challenge their role in the public/marketplace sphere, such
as Tide VII cases, the domestic relations exception allows federal
courts to avoid cases in which women challenge their role in the pri-
vate/family sphere.1
8 '
According to Cahn, the federalism objections to the VAWA are
simply an extension of this historical discrimination against cases in-
volving intrafamily relationships, and the "overcrowding" concern is a
value judgment on the importance of violence against women. Cahn
argues:
[T]he traditional aversion to family law appears to... explain the fed-
eral judiciary's reaction to the VAWA. The notion that federal courts
should not overload their schedules with domestic relations cases im-
plies that these cases are not as important as others which should... fill
up the... dockets.... The concern is not with overcrowding the courts,
but with the types of cases that the courts might be forced to hear.1
Similarly, Reva Siegel argues that federalism objections to the
VAWA result from jurists looking at a civil rights remedy that names
violence against women as gender discrimination through the old,
While the "separate spheres" ideology was explicit in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, it is now an implicit underlying theme that permeates the Court's family
law decisions. There are two aspects to the Court's public/private dichotomy
in family law: one between the states, which provide public regulation, and
the family, which, notwithstanding public regulation, still belongs to the pri-
vate sphere; and a second between the federal and state courts. The federal
courts generally respect state interests and regulation concerning dependent
intrafamily relationships, but they do not defer to state law when an examina-
tion of such relationships is not central.
Id. at 1101-02.
'go See id. at 1101. According to Cahn:
When a domestic relations case looks like another case over which federal
courts typically exercise diversity jurisdiction, such as a tort or contract case,
and does not involve a determination of the ongoing nature of family rela-
tionships, then the Court will proceed.... When a domestic relations case re-
quires an examination of the interdependencies within the family, or of ongo-
ing family relationships, the Court relegates the case to the state courts.
Id.
1 See id. at 1100 ("In the private sphere of the family, the Court does not examine
women's traditional role, while in the public sphere of the workplace, women can suc-
cessfully challenge the status quo.").
18 Id. at 1110.
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flawed lens of marital privacy. "Federalism" is merely the name given
the confusion caused by the paradigm shift:
In [federalism] objections the issue of gender bias that prompted
VAWA's enactment recedes from view, and sexualized assault appears as
a problem concerning "family matters." ... It is only by virtue of this his-
torical tradition that significant audiences of lawmakers and jurists find
it at all persuasive to characterize acts of rape or battery as matters of
"domestic relations" law, or the stuff of "acrimonious" "divorce negotia-
tions," or as "sensitive policy issue [s]," or "matters traditionally entrusted
to the states." In short, it is because critics of the civil rights remedy are
still reasoning within the common law tradition the statue seeks to dises-
tablish that they can characterize VAWA as intruding in regulatory do-
mains that are not properly of federal concern.1ss
Given judges' training in the doctrine of marital privacy and the con-
sensus that family law is exempt from federal purview, it is hardly sur-
prising that some judges object to the VAWA. The VAWA directly
challenges the status quo of marital privacy and a federalism that ac-
cords secondary status to women's issues.
4. The Effect of United States v. Lopez on the VAWA
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court reasserted the long-
ignored "outer limits" of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause.'84 Thus, Lopez rendered the civil rights remedy vulnerable to
attack on the ground that it is an overextension of Congress's com-
merce power.183 For the purposes of this Comment, I will sketch the
outlines of the Commerce Clause question after Lopez only to the ex-
tent that the uncertainty engendered by Lopez affects the analysis of
the VAWA's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.
18 6
In Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act
("the GFSZA") ,187 which made it a federal criminal offense to possess
'83 Siegel, supra note 9, at 2201-02 (second alteration in original) (footnotes omit-
ted).
184 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
185 For example, defendants in each district court case challenged the VAWA on
Commerce Clause theories. See infra Part II.B.
For a comprehensive treatment of the effect of Lopez on the VAWA concluding
that the VAWA is a constitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power, see Kerrie
E. Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights
Provision of the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1876 (1996);
see also Nourse, supra note 2, at 18-23 (discussing ramifications of Lopez).
187 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (A) (1994).
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a gun in a school zone.e The Court emphasized that Congress may
only regulate "(1) the use of channels of interstate commerce, (2) the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in in-
terstate commerce, and (3) those activities that substantially affect in-
terstate commerce."'8 The Lopez decision addressed the outer
boundaries of federalism via the third prong,'90 and is important here
because the VAWA, like the GFSZA, must be analyzed under the third191
prong. The Court held that the outer boundary of the third prong
is represented by those statutes that regulate an "economic activity that
might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce."92  In addition, a statute, such as a criminal
statute, that "has nothing to do with... any sort of commercial en-
terprise,"'93 may be within the outer boundary if (1) it is "an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regula-
tory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated," 94 or (2) the statute possesses a "jurisdictional element,
[that] ensure[s]" the specific act in question actually "affects inter-
state commerce." 95
Supporters of the VAWA argue that the regulated activity in the
statute is discrimination and that the Court has always upheld dis-
crimination statutes against commerce challenges, 96 as it did in Heart
m See id. § 922(q) (2) (A).
" Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D. Conn. 1996) (citing Lopez. 514 U.S. at
558-59).
0 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (stating that if the GFSZA is "to be sustained, it must
be under the third category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects inter-
state commerce").
. SeeDoe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 612-15 (recognizing the application of the third-
prong analysis to the VAWA).
19 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added).
'9S Id. at 561.
'9 Id. The Court reasoned:
Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic ac-
tivity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a




' See Maloney, supra note 186, at 1916-17 (arguing that the regulated activity is
business, Congress's concern is the effect of discrimination on business, and the
VAWA is constitutional based on Supreme Court precedent); Nourse, supra note 2, at
20 ("[T]he links to commerce ... are precisely the same ones present in cases brought
under sexual harassment and race discrimination statutes.").
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of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United State 97 and Katzenbach v. McClung."
Focusing on the jurisdictional element, Victoria Nourse argues that
Lopez prevents the Court from allowing individual effects on com-
merce to be combined "in cases where the statute provides no way of
distinguishing between federal and state spheres of action."' The
VAWA supplies a distinguishing factor, however, because it does not
preempt state regulation of the discrimination in the form of criminal
prosecutions or state civil suits.200
Despite the strong arguments of the supporters, there is some
language in Lopez that a reviewing court could seize upon to call the
VAWA into question. For example, ChiefJustice Rehnquist expressed
his concern that prior court decisions were leading to a conversion of
the commerce power into a "general police power."2"' The Govern-
ment argued that guns in schools threaten the learning environment
which, in turn, will hamper the nation's future productivity. 2 The
Chief Justice countered that argument by noting that according to
the Government's logic, "Congress could regulate any activity that it
found was related to the productivity of individual citizens: family law
(including marriage, divorce, and child custody) ."2° This concern, of
course, echoes his federalism concerns about the earlier drafts of the
VAWA.
204
B. Challenges to the VAWA in the Federal Courts
To date, there have been six reported challenges to the constitu-
tionality of the VAWA.2 The defendant(s) in each case filed a mo-
tion to dismiss and/or a motion for summary judgment,216 challeng-
'9' 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a
private motel).
"s 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a
private restaurant).
'" Nourse, supra note 2, at 21.
See id. at 21-23 (noting that the VAWA contains such a distinguishing element).
20' United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995); see also Maloney, supra note
186, at 1906-07 ("The Court's greatest fear, however, was authorizing Congress to pass
any type of legislation under a plenary police power.").
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64
2's Id. at 564.
See supra text accompanying notes 172-76 (highlighting the federalism con-
cerns).
20' See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
See Doe v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339, 1341 (8th Cir. 1998) (motion to dismiss);
Crisonino v. New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
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ing Congress's authority to enact the civil rights remedy under the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.2°' Doe v. Doe, de-
cided in June 1996, was the first case to consider the constitutionality
of the VAWA. The district court in Doe v. Doe upheld the VAWA un-
der the Commerce Clause, declining to reach the question of con-
gressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. A month
later in Bzonkala, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
208Virginia, in an opinion by Judge Kiser, struck down the statute,
holding that Congress lacked power under both the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge panel of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Kiser's opinion, and
209rehearing en banc is pending. In the meantime, the district courts
in Seaton, Doe v. Hartz, Anisimov, and Crisonino upheld the VAWA un-
der the Commerce Clause.2 ° Although the legal question in each
case was the constitutionality of the VAWA under the two sources of
congressional power, the Doe v. Doe, Brzonkala, Seaton, and Anisimov
opinions each addressed the federalism concerns discussed above.
The courts in Brzonkala and Seaton in particular appeared to be rea-
soning within the paradigm of privacy in their discussions of federal-
ism. Finally, the Brzonkala opinion incorporated the DeShaney defini-
tion of state action.
(motion for summary judgment); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 532 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (motion to dismiss); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (E.D. Tenn.
1997) (motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss); Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 783 (W.D. Va. 1996) (motion to dismiss),
reu'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated, WASH.
POsT, Feb. 8, 1998, atB3 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D.
Conn. 1996) (motion to dismiss).
207 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994) (asserting Congress's constitutional power
to enact the VAWA); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 52-53 (1991) (highlighting Congress's
power to act under both the Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment).
In 1991, the same court held that the Virginia Military Institute's exclusion of
women did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, a decision that the Supreme Court
later overturned. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991),
affd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
209 The Fourth Circuit upheld the VAWA under the Commerce Clause. See
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 973 (4th Cir. 1998)
("We hold that Congress had.., a rational basis in enacting VAWA."), reh'g en banc
granted and opinion vacated, WASH. POsT, Feb. 8, 1998, at B3 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998).
However, in February 1998, the Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc which oc-
curred on March 3, 1998. The prior opinions, therefore, have no precedential value.
See Telephone Interview with Clerk of Court, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit (Mar. 31, 1998).
21D See Crisonino, 985 F. Supp. at 395, 397; Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 540; Seaton, 971
F. Supp. at 1194; Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1434 (N.D. Iowa 1997),rev'd in part
and vacated in part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998).
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1. Doe v. Doe Upheld the VAWA
The Doe v. Doe action derived from a long-term abusive marriage.
From 1978 to 1995, John Doe threw Jane Doe "to the floor, kick[ed]
her, [threw] sharp and dangerous objects at her, threaten [ed] to kill
her, and destroy[ed her] property. "211 Mr. Doe also "forced her 'to be
a "slave" and [to] perform all manual labor, including maintaining
and laying out his clothes for his numerous dates with his many girl-
friends and mistresses.'
212
In reaching its holding that the VAWA was within Congress's
213commerce power, the district court rejected numerous arguments
by the defendant deriving from Lopez. The court held that Lopez did
not overrule the two-part test articulated in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,214 for determining whether legislative ac-
tion is within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.2's First,
Congress must have a rational basis for determining whether the
regulated activity "sufficiently affects commerce."2 1 6  Second, the
means chosen by Congress must be reasonably adapted to the ends.1 7
The district court distinguished the VAWA from the GFSZA in
Lopez, pointing out that the VAWA was replete with legislative history
2181concerning the effect of violence on commerce, whereas the statute
211 Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D. Conn. 1996).
212 Id.
213 The Doe v. Doe case did not address the 14th Amendment issue.
214 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The Hodel Court articulated the test of constitutionality
under the Commerce Clause:
The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular exercise of
congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively narrow.
The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity af-
fects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding.
This established, the only remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether
"the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end
permitted by the Constitution." The judicial task is at an end once the court
determines that Congress acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory
scheme.
Id. at 276 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964)).
21 Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613 (denying the defendant's argument that Lopez
overruled Hodel's rationality test).
216 Id. at 612 (citing Hode4 452 U.S. at 276); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) (same).
217 See Hod4e 452 U.S. at 276.
218 See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 615.
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in Lopez lacked such history.29 Because of the extensive legislative his-
tory, the court held that there was a rational basis to conclude that
gender-based violence is a national problem affecting interstate
commerce:
Certainly the repetitive nationwide impact of women withholding, with-
drawing or limiting their participation in the workplace or marketplace
in response to... gender-based violence.., is of such a nature to be [a]
substantial ... impact on interstate commerce ....
... [T]his Court concludes that the statistical, medical, and eco-
nomic data before the Congress adequately demonstrated the rational
basis for Congress' findings that gender-based violence has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.
Next, the district court held that the statutory scheme adopted in
the VAWA was "reasonably adapted to an end permitted by the Con-
stitution."221 The court also rejected the defendant's federalism ar-
guments that the VAWA "impermissibly 'federalizes' criminal, family
law, and state tort law."2 Rather than encroaching upon state
authority, the VAWA civil rights remedy serves as a federal supple-
ment to existing state tort and criminal law.
2. Brzonkala Held the VAWA Unconstitutional
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia reached the opposite
result, holding that the VAWA was unconstitutional under both the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.224 Although
Judge Kiser's opinion has no precedential value, it illustrates the type
of reasoning that the full Fourth Circuit or another reviewing court
219 See id. at 612 (noting the lack of legislative history in the GFSZA); see also Lopez,
514 U.S. at 563 ("But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected in-
terstate commerce .... they are lacking here.").
m" Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614-15.
22 Id. at 617.
m Id. at 616.
22 See id. at 616 ("The significance of this Act is its recognition of a federal civil
right, with attendant remedies, which is distinct in remedy and purpose from state tort
claims.... [T]here is no impermissible encroachment or federalization of states' tra-
ditional police powers."); see also S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993) (stating that the
VAWA is not intended to create a general federal criminal law for assaults and rapes
against women).
24 935 F. Supp. 779, 782 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g
en banc granted and opinion vacated WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at B3 (4th Cir. Feb. 5,
1998).
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could adopt to strike down the VAWA.Y In addition, Judge Kiser's
opinion still represents the only time a court has considered the
VAWA's constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The facts in the case are as follows. Two college football players,
Morrison and Crawford, gang-raped Brzonkala, a classmate they had
met thirty minutes earlier. After the rape, one of the players
screamed at Brzonkala, 'You better not have any fucking diseases."26
Later, Morrison bragged publicly that he liked to get "girls drunk and
fuck the shit out of them." 7 At school disciplinary hearings,
Morrison admitted having sexual contact with Brzonkala, and that she
had told him "no" twice.22 Despite Morrison's admissions, Crawford
denied that he had sexual contact with Brzonkala.2 Initially, the
school suspended Morrison, but it later set aside the suspension and
reduced the charge to "using abusive language."20 The district court
determined that the players' actions were sufficient to allow the case
to go forward on the issue of whether there was "gender motivated
animus."23'  Nevertheless, the court dismissed the action on the
ground that Congress lacked the authority to enact the VAWA under
both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.ns
The court began its discussion of the Commerce Clause by ex-
plaining that the VAWA falls within the third category of activities ar-
See supra note 209 (describing the procedural history of Brzonkala).
22 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
W Id. An unidentified male student-athlete also told Crawford that he should
have "killed the bitch." Id.
228 See id.
2 See id.
23 Id. at 781-82.
231 See id. at 784-85. The court found it significant that it was a stranger rape, a
gang rape, and that the players did not use condoms. However, the court's analysis of
the difference between stranger and date rape is highly problematic. Judge Kiser's
opinion states that "date rape could involve a misunderstanding and is often less violent
than stranger rape .... Date rape could also involve a situation where a man's sexual
passion provokes the rape by decreasing the man's control .... Finally, date rape could
involve in part disrespect for the victim as a person, not as a woman...." Id. (emphasis
added). These statements reflect the all-too-common misunderstandings that rape is
about sexual passion, and that a rape perpetrated by a man who knows his victim is
somehow less of a rape for the victim. In addition, it is unclear how one could hate a
person stripped of her gender. The court went on to conclude, somewhat incompre-
hensibly, that although Morrison's statement that he likes to "fuck the shit" out of
drunk women revealed a "history of taking pleasure from having inter-
course.., without their sober consent," it did not mean that Morrison said that "he
likes to rape women." Id. But see Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 540-41 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (characterizing these findings as "dubious").
23 See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 800-01.
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ticulated in Lopez, namely, "those activities having a substantial rela-
tion to interstate commerce."23 The court then proceeded to com-
pare the GFSZA in Lopez to the VAWA civil rights remedy. It deter-
mined that "the regulated activity [in the VAWA] is the violent crime,
whereas in Lopez the regulated activity was an act that could lead to a
violent crime."2 He then determined that both the VAWA and the
GFSZA focus on activities "too remote from interstate commerce," in-
volve "intrastate activity" that is not "economic in nature," and lack
jurisdictional elements limiting the statute to cases where the regu-
lated activity affects interstate commerce2 5 In reaching its decision,
the court ignored the extensive congressional findings of the linkages
between interstate commerce and violence against women in the
VAWA legislative history, citing Lopez for the proposition that con-
gressional findings are useful, but not decisive.2 6
The court concluded that allowing Congress to pass an act like
the VAWA would give it constitutionally impermissible and un-
bounded power: "[I]f VAWA is a permissible use of the commerce
power because of the regulated activity's effect on the national econ-
omy, which in turn affects interstate commerce, then it would be in-
consistent to deny the commerce power's extension into family law,
most criminal laws, and even insomnia."2s
This language parallels Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern that the
commerce power not become a stand-in for a "plenary police
power."m Like the Chief Justice's language in Lopez, the district
court's Commerce Clause objections in Brzonkala share logical reso-
nance with the early federalism objections to the VAWA discussed
above.29 The court's conclusion that the VAWA is outside the scope
of the commerce power may have been determined by its decision
that the regulated activity is violent crime, 24 not discrimination. This
designation makes the parallel between the VAWA and the GFSZA
appear more appropriate. The VAWA, however, is a civil rights rem-
edy regulating the gender discrimination manifested in crimes of vio-
See id. at 786 (identifying the three categories of permissible regulation).
Id. at 790; see id at 791 ("VAWA regulates local criminal activity.").
M Id.
2* See id at 789 ("The commerce power is based on a reasonable effect on inter-
state commerce, not on Congress's perceived effect on commerce.").
27 Id. at 793 (emphasis added).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
2" See supra Part II.A.3.
20 See supra text accompanying note 234.
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lence motivated by gender, not a criminal statute.241 The court's
analogy would be more appropriate for a case challenging the new
federal criminal offenses of interstate domestic violence, interstate
stalking, and interstate violation of a protective order also created in
the VAWA.
242
The district court rejected the Fourteenth Amendment theory of
congressional authority to enact the VAWA by appealing to the doc-
trine of state action. The court began by reading Kaztenbach v.
Morgan to require some degree of state action for an equal protec-
tion violation.244 It then announced that the standard for constitu-
tionality would be "whether Congress's ends are legitimate" and
"whether Congress's means are legitimate."24 5 To determine whether
the ends were legitimate, the court identified Congress's goals in en-
acting the VAWA-"(1) to remedy private individuals' gender-based
violence and (2) to remedy gender-based deficiencies in the states'
criminal justice systems '24 6 -and then searched for some element of
state action.
The first goal failed because "[t]he state action at issue (the
inadequacies in the state criminal systems) does not cause, or,
in any significant manner, even contribute to, the deprivation
caused by the individual criminal."247 The court rejected a Shelley v.
24' The legislative history of the VAWA stresses the distinction between criminal
prosecutions and civil rights remedies, namely that "[w]hile traditional criminal
charges ... focus on the harm to the individual, a civil rights claim redresses an assault
on a commonly shared ideal of equality." S. REP. No. 102-197, at 49 (1991).
242 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
242 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
244 See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 794-95
(W.D. Va. 1996) ("Morgan does not permit Congress to act against purely private ac-
tion incidentally giving rise to state action which causes a denial of equal protection."),
rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated, WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at B3 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998).
245 Id. at 796-97.
2'6 Id. at 797. In Senate Report 138, Congress stated that its purpose was to
"attack[] gender-motivated crimes that threaten women's equal protection of the laws"
and to "provide[] a necessary remedy to fill the gaps and rectify the biases of existing
State laws." S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55 (1993).
247 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 797. But see Amar & Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1372
(arguing that so-called state inaction is really action because "when child abuse laws
are not enforced, state custody law effectively grants parents absolute proprietary
power to dominate and degrade their children"); cf. Schneider, supra note 147, at 978
(arguing that lack of state enforcement of domestic violence laws supports the batterer
in his actions, leaving the victim to her own resources).
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Kraemer interpretation of state action whereby the state's role in fa-
cilitating sex discrimination by inadequately enforcing its criminal
statutes when women are the victims would constitute state action.
The court distinguished Shelley stating that, in Shelley, a state actor-
the court-enforced the private, discriminatory restrictive covenant
while, in a hypothetical VAWA situation where the state declines to
arrest a violent criminal, the state has not acted but has "'merely ab-
stain [ed] from action.' 2 49 Although the court did not cite DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,5 this language echoes
the Supreme Court's language in that case. In DeShaney, a case involv-
ing abuse of a young child, the Court denied Joshua DeShaney's due
process claim because the harm was caused by Joshua's father, not by
the State of Wisconsin (despite state knowledge of and involvement
with Joshua).25' Once again, the district court did not acknowledge
that a private crime may also involve public discrimination.
The court found that the goal of eliminating state discrimination
in the enforcement of criminal laws is a legitimate goal under Con-
gress's Section 5 enforcement power. The court concluded, however,
that the VAWA does not address this concern because the statute pro-
vides a remedy against individuals, not the state.22 In addition, the
court found that the VAWA remedy is both overinclusive (providing a
civil rights action for a woman whose state did not discriminate) and
underinclusive (providing no remedy where the state discriminates,
253but the crime was not motivated by gender).
248 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1947) (holding that a state court's enforcement of a racially
discriminatory restrictive covenant constituted sufficient state action to implicate the
14th Amendment).
242 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 799 (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19). This idea that
state action only includes affirmative acts is increasingly being challenged by constitu-
tional scholars. See, e.g., Amar & Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1360-63 (questioning the
formulation of state action in DeShaney); Minow, supra note 144, at 1668-76 (same);
West, supra note 127, at 144 ("Whether the state's failure to protect constitutes an ac-
tion or inaction ... is not determinative. What is determinative are the consequences
of the state's conduct....").
20 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
2' See supra Part II.A.1 (analyzing the DeShaney decision).
252 See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 800 ("Instead of addressing the Fourteenth
Amendment violation by the states' criminal justice system, VAWA authorizes a cause
of action against an individual who did not contribute in any real sense to the unequal
treatment in the states' criminal justice systems.").
25 See id
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3. Subsequent Cases Upheld the VAWA
Under the Commerce Clause
The four district court cases decided after Bizonkala all upheld the
VAWA under the Commerce Clause. Three of the courts first deter-
mined that the plaintiff adequately pled conduct that would be a
crime of violence motivated by gender. In both Anisimov v. Lake
and Crisonino v. New York City Housing Authority,*55 plaintiffs sued their
employers for violence that occurred at work. Anisimov alleged that
her dentist/employer fondled her, grabbed her breasts, and assaulted
256
and raped her in a remote location. Crisonino alleged that her su-
pervisor called her a "'dumb bitch"' and pushed her to the floor caus-
ing permanent injuries. In Seaton v. Seaton, Laurel Seaton sued her
ex-husband for, among other claims, assault and sexual abuse that oc-
curred during and after their marriage. In Doe v. Hartz, Doe alleged
that "Father Hartz 'came up behind her, grabbed her with both of his
hands and pulled her back into his body, held her tightly and kissed
her neck"'5 9 when she arrived at church to sing for Mass.
2 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
25 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
26 See Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 532. The court held that the rape constituted a
crime of violence motivated by gender. See id. at 541 ("The Court finds that
Anisimov's allegations ... are sufficient to... state a claim under the VAWA's Civil
Rights Remedy.").
7 risonino, 985 F. Supp. at 388. The Court found that the alleged conduct con-
stituted a crime of violence motivated by gender. The elements of a crime of violence
motivated by gender were met because the conduct alleged could be a felony and a
jury could reasonably conclude that calling the plaintiff "dumb bitch" and then throw-
ing her to the floor was "due, at least in part, to an animus based on her gender." Id.
at 391.
M 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1997). The pendant state law tort claims,
except for claims related to assaults within one year, were dismissed because of the
one-year statute of limitations in Tennessee. See id. at 1195.
259 Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (N.D. Iowa 1997), reu'd in part and vacated
in part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998). The district court determined
that Doe "has adequately pleaded, although just barely, each of the essential elements
of a [VAWA] claim." Id. at 1434. The court held that the "predicate offense," the Iowa
crime of sexual exploitation by a counselor or a therapist, see IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 709.15 (West 1993), was a crime of violence motivated by gender. See Doe v. Hartz,
970 F. Supp. at 1397-404. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that Hartz's conduct as pled by Doe was not a crime of violence motivated by gen-
der because it would only constitute an aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law. See
Doe v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (8th Cir. 1998). In addition, the court held that
Doe "has not stated a claim under the VAWA because she has failed to plead a viola-
tion of the Iowa statute, the predicate offense upon which she relies." Id.
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMENACT
To determine if Congress had the power to enact the VAWA pur-
suant to its Commerce Clause powers, each of the district courts fol-
lowed Doe v. Doe in using the two-part Hodel test.'60 The Anisimov court
articulated the test in a manner similar to the other three courts when
it said: "The question before this Court is whether a rational basis ex-
ists for concluding that gender-motivated violence affects interstate
commerce. And if it does, whether the VAWA is a reasonably adapted
means to the intended goal of Congress." 6'
In determining that there was a rational basis, each court gave
significant weight to the extensive congressional findings linking vio-
lence against women to interstate commerce.' 62 All four courts re-
marked on the fact that there were four years of congressional hear-
ings and were impressed by the amount and seriousness of Congress's
findings.26 3 The Seaton court, for example, found that Congress had a
rational basis to conclude that violence against women substantially
affects interstate commerce when "one-half of the nation's population
is potentially limited in employment, traveling, and participation in
commercial spending due to the threat of violence. 26 4 The court
continued:
210 See Crisonino, 985 F. Supp. at 395-96 (adopting the Hodel test); Anisimov, 982 F.
Supp. at 538 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 276 (1981)); Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1192 (quoting Hode 452 U.S. at 276); Doe v.
Hartz, 970 F. Supp. at 1415 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995),
and Hode4 452 U.S. at 276); see also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 968 n.1l (4th Cir. 1997) (citing decisions from the 10 circuits em-
ploying the rational basis test post-Lopez), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated,
WASH. PoST, Feb. 8, 1998, at B3 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998).
2 Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 538.
212 The courts differed slightly in the amount of weight to be given congressional
findings, but all agreed that congressional findings were still relevant after Lopez See
Crisonino, 985 F. Supp. at 395 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562, for the proposition that
courts should "consider" legislative findings in their "'independent evaluation' of con-
stitutionality"); Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 539 (stating that congressional findings re-
ceive deference); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. at 1422 ("[I]n light of these findings, giv-
ing them the deference they are properly due in a Commerce Clause analysis, this
court finds that there was undeniably a rational basis for Congress's conclusions that
gender-motivated violence has a substantial effect on interstate commerce."); see also
Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 968 (citing cases concerning the high level of deference given to
congressional findings, post-Lopez).
See Crisonino, 985 F. Supp. at 395 (referring to "four years of hearing and study"
and "voluminous legislative findings," and quoting the "more compelling" findings);
Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 537 (characterizing the congressional findings as "startling");
Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1192 (stating that Congress cited a "plethora of shocking statis-
tics"); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. at 1421 (characterizing the findings as "staggering");
see also Bizonkala, 132 F.3d at 964 (referring to a "mountain of evidence").
2 Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1194.
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[I] t is unlikely that Congress would spend four years determining the ef-
fects of gender-based violence on interstate commerce for the sole pur-
pose of overcoming the rationality test .... Therefore, it is apparent
that ... the legislative findings suffice under the rational basis test to
place VAWA within the rubric of the Commerce Clause.
2
6
The Anisimov court used even stronger language, stating that "this
court believes that to set aside four years of extensive and well-
reasoned congressional findings demonstrating the substantial effect
of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce would be to
usurp a constitutional role that the Court was not allotted."
26
The courts then turned to the question of whether the VAWA
remedy was a "reasonably adapted means to the intended goal of
Congress"-to address violence against women. 26 7 The courts found
that the remedy was reasonably adapted, particularly in light of the
long tradition of civil rights legislation under the Commerce Clause.... 268
addressing private discrimination. The Crisonino court, for exam-
ple, wrote that the VAWA "fits squarely within the tradition of federal
,,269civil rights legislation.
Although the structure of the four decisions is remarkably similar,
the tone set by each court is very different. In Seaton, in particular,
JudgeJarvis "reluctantly" upheld the VAWA .2 The court's reluctance
stemmed from federalism concerns about the civil rights remedy, as
discussed in Part II.A.3: "[T]he court must note its extreme discom-
fort with the sweeping nature of VAWA.... The Framers of the Con-
stitution did not intend for the federal courts to play host to domestic
2"5 Id.; see also Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 973 ("In light of Congress's findings well sup-
ported by testimony and data, we hold that Congress had.., a rational basis in enact-
ing VAWA.").
Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 539.
27 Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1194.
See Crisonino, 985 F. Supp. at 397 (characterizing the VAWA as a "reasonable
means to a legitimate end"); Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 540 (same); Seaton, 971 F. Supp.
at 1194 (same); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. at 1434 ("[T]he means Congress adopted in
the civil remedies provision of the VAWA to combat gender-motivated violence were
reasonably adapted to that goal.").
2 Crisonino, 985 F. Supp. at 397; see also Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. at 1434 (stating
that the VAWA "mirror[s] other statutory provisions for private enforcement of civil
rights").
270 Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1193 ("This court is quite reluctantly inclined to agree
with the Doe court and finds that Congress had a rational basis for determining that
violence against women sufficiently affects interstate commerce."); see also id. at 1194-
95 (stating that although the court is "convinced" Congress "could have drafted a bet-
ter law" and "disagree [s] with the inclusiveness of VAWA, the Act itself is not an unrea-
sonable means to the ends intended by Congress").
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disputes and invade the well-established authority of the sovereign
states."2"'
The Anisimov court disagreed, stating that the VAWA is not an in-
vasion of state sovereignty because it is a civil rights remedy that does
not "duplicate or usurp the authority of the States."2 2 Nevertheless,
that court also expressed some uncertainties concerning the scope of
the commerce power because of the enduring "unanswered" ques-
tions after Lopez_2 3 Accordingly, the Anisimov court certified the ques-
tion of VAWA's constitutionality for an interlocutory appeal to the
Seventh Circuit, stating that the issue of constitutionality "involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground
for a difference of opinion."7 4
C. Privacy, Federalism, State Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment
The consensus among the courts that have considered the consti-
tutionality of the VAWA under the Commerce Clause seems to be that
the VAWA civil rights remedy is constitutional. 27" Nevertheless, the
Anisimov court's certification of the question regarding the constitu-
tionality of the VAWA under the Commerce Clause for interlocutory
appeal indicates that the VAWA's constitutionality under the Com-
merce Clause remains an open question. In addition, only the
Brzonkala district court opinion has addressed whether Congress had
271 Id. at 1190-91.
272 Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 540 ("The Supreme Court has historically recognized
that with respect to civil rights legislation: 'The power of Congress ... is broad and
sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates no express constitutional limi-
tation it has been the rule of this Court... not to interfere.'" (quoting Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964))); see also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 971 (4th Cir. 1997) ("VAWA acts to supplement, rather than
supplant, state criminal, civil, and family law controlling gender violence."), reh'g en
banc granted and opinion vacated WASH. PoST, Feb. 8, 1998, at B3 (4th Cir. Feb. 5,
1998).
273 See Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 535 (listing three outstanding issues and proclaim-
ing itself "not alone in... uncertainty concerning how the Supreme Court will ap-
proach these issues when it considers, future challenges to congressional authority un-
der the Commerce Clause").
274 Id. at 541 (citing the 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) standards for an interlocutory appeal);
see also Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. at 1435 (certifying a question for interlocutory ap-
peal and citing the split between the then two district court opinions as the basis for
concluding there is a "substantial ground for difference of opinion").
275 See Mattison v. Click Corp. of Am., Civ. A. No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 WL 32597, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998) (mem.) (citing decisions rejecting "constitutional challenges
to the VAWA" and concluding that "[t]he reasoning [in the opinions] is compelling
and clearly supports the conclusion that the VAWA passes constitutional muster").
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the power to enact the VAWA pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Commentators predict that the Supreme Court will
hear a VAWA case when the opportunity arises. 76
When that case is argued, a Thirteenth Amendment theory may
provide additional constitutional authority for the VAWA civil rights
remedy by rebutting arguments against the statute based on (1) the
historically pedigreed doctrines of privacy and the federal domestic-
relations exception; (2) the doctrine that state action encompasses
only affirmative state action; or (3) an interpretation of Lopez that ex-
cludes the remedy from the realm of legitimate congressional author-
ity. The Thirteenth Amendment cuts through distinctions based on
the public-private dichotomy because the Thirteenth Amendment has
always reached into the private realm.277 The Thirteenth Amendment
deflates federalism objections because, by its very enactment, it super-
seded federalism.278 The Thirteenth Amendment erases any distinc-
tion between positive and negative state action because it has never
required state action. 279 Additionally, a Thirteenth Amendment the-
ory nullifies Lopez objections because the VAWA need not rely on the
commerce power. If the right to be free from gender-motivated vio-
lence can be found within the Thirteenth Amendment, then privacy,
state action, and federalism objections must yield to the new civil
rights remedy. In Part III, the relationship between the Thirteenth
Amendment and violence against women will be explored to show
how the VAWA is at the center of Thirteenth Amendment concerns.
280
276 See, e.g., Duncan Mansfield, Gender-Motivated Violence Law Survives Fed Court Test
in Tenn., DAILY REc., July 11, 1997, at 24 (stating that appeals of the VAWA are ex-
pected to reach the Supreme Court); Tony Mauro, Court Cools After Hot Term: Following
a Rash of Groundbreaking Cases, the Court Sees a Quieter Time, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997,
at S32 (predicting that the Court might hear a VAWA case in the near future).
277 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883) ("Under the thirteenth
amendment, the legislation... may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of
individuals ... ."); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) ("[S]urely
there has never been any doubt of the power of Congress to impose liability on private
persons under (the 13th Amendment) .... ").
278 SeeJacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
39 CAL. L. REv. 171, 174 (1951) (characterizing the 13th Amendment as a "revolution
in federalism" and stating that opponents of the amendment believed it to be an
"invasion of the rights of the states and a corresponding unwarrantable extension of
the power of the central government").
279 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23 ("[T]he Thirteenth Amend-
ment ... may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether
sanctioned by State legislation or not.. ").
280 See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1373-74 (arguing that the 13th Amend-
ment should supersede the traditional parent-child relationship and reach into the
THE V!OLENCE AGAINST WOMENA CT
III. REJECTING SETTLED CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
A PROPOSED THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT THEORY FOR
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENACT THE VAWA
In 1878, Elizabeth Cady Stanton said the following about constitu-
tional interpretation:
"A century of discussion has not yet made the constitution under-
stood .... It has no settled interpretation. Being a series of compro-
mises, it can be expounded in favor of many directly opposite princi-
ples .... [T]he numerous demands by the people for national
protection in many rights not specified by the constitution, prove that
the people have outgrown the compact that satisfied the fathers."
281
Although Stanton addressed the Constitution's failure to encompass
women's suffrage,282 her words are an appropriate introduction to a
discussion of whether the Thirteenth Amendment provides constitu-
tional authority for the VAWA civil rights remedy. This Comment di-
rectly conflicts with the settled interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment in formulating a constitutional basis for the VAWA. It
follows a newer strain of Thirteenth Amendment theory that aims to
return the Amendment to its full power-to a time before limiting
glosses were added by post-Reconstruction courts.
2
83
family where there is severe child abuse because, if the 13th Amendment never comes
between parent and child, then many slave masters would have been able to circum-
vent the amendment by claiming those slaves who were also their biological children).
28' Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman
Suffrage, and the United States Constitution 1820-1878, in A LESS THAN PERFEcT UNION:
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECrIvEs ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 104, 131 (Jules Lobel ed.,
1988) [hereinafter A LESS THAN PERFET UNION] (emphasis added) (quoting 3
HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 87, 88 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., Rochester,
John Dick 1881)).
282 See id. passim.
283 SeenAmar, Remember the Thirteenth, supra note 9 (describing the variety of issues to
which the 13th Amendment can be applied, including child abuse and hate speech);
Amar, Women and the Constitution, supra note 9, at 467 ("Women ... were in large part
the agents and the subjects of the Thirteenth Amendment."); Amar & Widawsky, supra
note 9, at 1360 (arguing that the 13th Amendment "provides the best constitutional
vehicle" to address child abuse); Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995) (explaining the 13th Amendment's "vast
untapped potential as a teaching and litigation tool"); Andrew Koppelman, Forced La-
bor. A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 (1990)
(substituting the 13th Amendment as the constitutional authority for Roe v. Wade);
McConnell, supra note 9 (arguing that severe battering is 13th Amendment involun-
tary servitude); tenBroek, supra note 278 (rejecting a limited scope for the 13th
Amendment); Jennifer L. Conn, Note, Sexual Hafassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Re-
sponse 28 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 519 (1995) (applying the 13th Amendment to
sexual harassment); Neal Kumar Katyal, Note, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth
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A. Settled Interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment
The settled interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment is that it
applies only to situations of forced labor analogous to chattel slavery' 84
and that its implementing statutes reach only discrimination based on
race.2 15 Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery
and involuntary servitude forever, commanding that "[n]either slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist."2 86  Section 2 granted
Congress the authority to legislate to enforce the command of Sec-
tion 1.287 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court explained that enforce-
ment meant the power to regulate the "badges and incidents" of slav-28
ery. The Court's definition of badges and incidents derived, in
turn, from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,289 which was Congress's first
exercise of the Section 2 power and an attempt to clarify the nature of
the rights of citizenship housed in the Amendment. Those rights of
citizenship include the fundamental rights which are the essence of
civil freedom, namely, "the [same] right to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey.., property... as is enjoyed by white
citizens." 0 Therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery
and involuntary servitude and granted Congress authority to legislate
against any deprivation of the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights
Amendment Critique of Forced Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 793 (1993) (arguing that the
13th Amendment "reaches ... forced prostitution").
2' See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 283, at 28 ("For most of the Amendment's first cen-
tury, scholars did not dispute the Supreme Court's doctrine and dogmatically ad-
vanced two themes: first, the Amendment's prohibitions applied only to situations
involving enforced compulsory service; and second, the Amendment did not contain
affirmative rights protections.").
285 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 has been interpreted to cover racial, but not
gender, discrimination. See Bobo v. ITT, Continental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 344
(5th Cir. Nov. 1981).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)
(noting that the 13th Amendment "is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing
or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery.. . shall not exist in any part
of the United States" (emphasis added)); see alsoJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 438 (1968) (reaffirming this principle).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
M See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20 (stating that Congress has the power to
.pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in
the United States").
289 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
W Id.
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Acts. This traditional view is strengthened by the now canonical story
that
the Thirteenth Amendment [was] only the first step in a comprehensive
three-step plan designed, first, through the Thirteenth Amendment, to
abolish chattel slavery; second, through the Fourteenth Amendment, to
restore the freed Negro to a condition of civil equality; and third,
through the Fifteenth Amendment, to safeguard him in his political
rights ......
Women fit into this narrative, if at all, as freed slaves, or as the
292beneficiaries of a lesser form of equal protection. Married women
were subject to the loss of citizenship rights inherent in common-law
marriage until the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts.
2 93
Full political rights for women, the story continues, would not come
until 1920 with the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment.29 4 To
this day, the promise of the Thirteenth Amendment for women is
split down race lines. All women may claim the Amendment's protec-
tions against states of servitude recognized in the implementing anti-
peonage and involuntary servitude statutes.2s Black women may in-
voke the civil rights statutes based on the Thirteenth Amendment for
claims of racial discrimination. 6 Thus, a black woman must choose
an approach that often obscures the complex interplay of racial and
sexual discrimination and the historical fact that slavery was different
for men and women.2
291 tenBroek, supra note 278, at 173. This view was judicially recognized at least as
early as the Slaughter-House Cases. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-
72 (1872).
See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
2.3 The Married Women's Property Acts guaranteed women the "right to sue, to be
sued, to contract, and to own property." McConnell, supra note 9, at 249.
See U.S. CONST. amend XIX; see also Amar, Women and the Constitution, supra note
9, at 471 (arguing that the 19th Amendment restored symmetry to the Constitution by
assuring the same rights for women and African-Americans).
Z See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1994) (peonage); 18 id. §§ 1581-1588 (peonage and invol-
untary servitude); see also Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944)
(convicting Pierce of holding women in a state of peonage by forcing them to commit
acts of prostitution to repay debts incurred when Pierce paid fines for their release
from prison).
2' See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989) (finding
that Patterson, a black woman, could use 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibiting racial discrimi-
nation in the formation of contracts, as a basis for her claim of racially discriminatory
failure to promote).
2' Kimberle Crenshaw argues that under current Title VII law, black women are
forced to fit their claims into either a race or a sex discrimination model, an approach
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B. A Proposed Thirteenth Amendment Theory Supporting
the Civil Rights Remedy
This Comment presents two theories that justify Congress's
authority to enact the VAWA under Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
First, severe domestic violence, 98 child abuse, and child sexual
abusem are involuntary servitude. Section 2 grants Congress the
authority to legislate against involuntary servitude in whatever form it
may take.'00 Accordingly, Congress possesses constitutional authority
to enact those parts of the VAWA civil rights remedy that provide re-
lief for women and girls in severely abusive relationships. 1  Other
forms of modern violence against women, such as one-time rapes and
assaults, may also be reachable as incidents of the modem involuntary
servitude of severe battering.
Second, modem violence against women is a badge and incident
of nineteenth-century slavery and of the nineteenth-century involun-
tary servitude of coverture. Although slavery, as experienced by black
women, and coverture, as experienced by white women, were differ-
ent in degree, each involved reduced citizenship rights and elements
of violence. Today, violence against women still prevents women
which obscures the effect of combined discrimination and is best suited for those
within a class that are either "race" or "sex privileged":
[T]he paradigm of sex discrimination tends to be based on the experiences
of white women; the model of race discrimination tends to be based on the
experiences of the most privileged Blacks. Notions of what constitutes race
and sex discrimination are, as a result, narrowly tailored to embrace only a
small set of circumstances, none of which include discrimination against
Black women.
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Cri-
tique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139, 151.
2 Joyce McConnell argues that severe domestic violence is involuntary servitude.
See McConnell, supra note 9, at 209 ("[T]he key distinction between the battered
women's cases and the judicially recognized cases of involuntary servitude is the inti-
mate origin of their relationships and not the degree or nature of the coercion .... ").
2"" Akhil Amar and Daniel Widawsky argue that child abuse is slavery. See Amar &
Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1385 ("[T]he State... can be understood as enforcing this
servitude by rendering [the child] to his father, just as slaves were rendered to their
masters.").
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.").
301 This argument is an extension of McConnell's thesis. See McConnell, supra
note 9, at 251 ("[A] civil cause of action and remedy could be implied from the lan-
guage of the [13th A]mendment itself or from the federal involuntary servitude stat-
ute .... ").
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from exercising their full citizenship rights. Therefore, just as Con-
gress can enact legislation that addresses other badges and incidents
of nineteenth-century slavery,3 ' it has the power to enact the VAWA.
C. A Working Definition of Slavery
The Thirteenth Amendment is absolute in its command that
"[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the
United States.""3 The amendment forbids whatever is or was under-
stood to be slavery. Slavery has been described as a system of
"dominance and subservience" by Akhil Amar and Daniel Widawsky:
"The central concern of the Amendment is not labor, not adulthood,
not blackness, not state action, not biology, but slavery-a system of
dominance and subservience, often on a personal scale, and the re-
duction of human beings to the status of things."30 4  Amar and
Widawsky further point out that many antebellum legal thinkers
shared this view. For example, in 1829, Judge Ruffin of the North
Carolina Supreme Court wrote: "Such obedience [of a slave to a mas-
ter] is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the
body .... The power of the master must be absolute, to render the
submission of the slave perfect."0 5
Slavery circumscribed the public/marketplace and pri-
vate/familial spheres-especially for women. 00  For women, slavery
involved not only work in the field and housework in the master's
house, but also rape, physical assault, reproductive services, and the
torture of watching their children be harmed or sold. 7 Describing
the experience of slave women, Deborah White writes:
-' See supra Part III.A.
303 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1; see also Amar & Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1359
("[The 13th Amendment's] framers' disgust with 'the peculiar institution' led them to
announce a more universal, transcendent norm: slavery, of all forms and in all places,
shall not exist.... The Amendment embraced not only those slaves with some African
ancestry, but all persons, whatever their race or national origin.").
Amar & Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1384.
, Id. at 1370.
*"6 See DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE
PLANTATION SouTH 69 (1985) ("Male slavery centered mostly around the work that
black men did for whites. Female slavery had much to do with work, but much of it
was concerned with bearing, nourishing, and rearing children ... ."); McConnell, su-
pra note 9, at 217 ("To focus only on the economic aspect of slavery as a system of
production in the public sphere is to remove slavery from its hellish private context.").
507 For a comprehensive treatment of the work performed by slave women, see
WHITE, supra note 306. See also McConnell, supra note 9, at 219-20 ("[A]long with
forced economic production and domestic tasks, with their obvious counterparts in
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Once slaveholders realized that the reproductive function of the female
slave could yield a profit, the manipulation of procreative sexual rela-
tions became an integral part of the sexual exploitation of female slaves.
Few of the calculations made by masters and overseers failed to take a
slave woman's childbearing capacity into account.308
If Congress outlawed all aspects of chattel slavery, then Congress
outlawed its private and familial aspects as well . Moreover, if slavery
for women in the nineteenth century involved sexualized violence
and beatings, then those parts of slavery were also abolished. Thus,
any parallel relationship in the twentieth century involving sexualized
violence and assault directly implicates the Thirteenth Amendment.3 0
It should not matter to a Thirteenth Amendment analysis that the in-
cidents of slavery were differentiated based on sex and that animus
towards a slave took a different form based on his or her sex. There-
fore, the Thirteenth Amendment includes slavery's gender-specific
incidents and is not limited to marketplace or employer-employee re-
lationships.'
the free wage-labor system, came other personal services such as sex and reproduc-
tion.").
0 WHITE, supra note 306, at 68.
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872) ("Undoubtedly
while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thir-
teenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter."); Amar &
Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1368 ("To end slavery was thus to radically restructure this
'private' sphere, and to reorder not simply the political and economic system but the
social fabric as well.").
3'0 See McConnell, supra note 9, at 220 ("[In adopting the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, Congress not only forbade the legal ownership of human chattel (slavery) but
prohibited anyone from treating another as if such ownership existed (involuntary
servitude).").
3 See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1369 ("[A]Ithough forced labor for eco-
nomic gain was one characteristic of slavery as practiced in the antebellum South,
forced labor itself does not exhaust the meaning of slavery."); McConnell, supra note
9, at 211-15 (arguing that the original conception of the Amendment included more
than labor relationships).
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D. Original Intent of the Thirteenth Amendment'
2
The common wisdom-that the Thirteenth Amendment holds no
special promise for women's liberation-was not a settled interpreta-
tion in the 1860s. At the time of the congressional debates concern-
ing the Amendment, opponents, abolitionists, and women's rights ac-
tivists all recognized the Amendment's potential to create sweeping
new rights for both freed black women and married white women.313
During the Thirteenth Amendment debates, opponents of the
Amendment conjured up the specter of a reordering of the relation-
ship between husband and wife. 14 The master/slave and hus-
band/wife relationships, after all, were among the many classic legal
relationships with shared justifications. Representative White, for ex-
ample, protested that
[t]he parent has the right to the service of his child; he has a property in
the service of that child. A husband has a right of property in the serv-
ice of his wife; he has the right to the management of his household af-
fairs .... All these rights rest upon the same basis as a man's right of
property in the service of slaves s'-
Opponents to the change in federalism wrought by the Amend-
ment also equated the change with a breakdown in all of the classic
common-law relationships. For example, Representative Cox, who
claimed to object to the amendment because it would alter the bal-
ance of federalism, fulminated:
The effort is now to make ... abolition a function of the national Gov-
ernment.... Should we amend the Constitution so as to change the re-
lation of parent and child, guardian and ward, husband and wife, the laws
of inheritance, the laws of legitimacy? Where will it end, when once be-
312 Critical scholars have attacked the validity of using original intent to interpret
the Constitution. Randall Kennedy writes:
[T]he endeavor to confine choice by reference to the intentions of white
men situated in the eighteenth or nineteenth century should be rejected as
aspiration because, if followed, it would quite likely portend the nullification
of legal achievements that support the rights of racial minorities and others
whose interests in previous centuries generally had a lower level of priority
than obtains today.
Randall L. Kennedy, Race and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Power of Interpretational
Choice inALEssTHAN PEREEcTUNION, supra note 281, at 273, 275.
313 SeeDuBois, supra note 281, at 113 (discussing the women's rights activists' views
that the 13th Amendment opened doors to new freedoms for women).
314 See McConnell, supra note 9, at 215-16 ("Some Congressmen expressed concern
that the Thirteenth Amendment had the potential to reach into the private sphere of
the home and to alter the traditional relationship between husband and wife.").
3" CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865) (statement of Rep. White).
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gun? Is it, then, a question of slavery, or is it a question of home free-
dom in home affairs; a State question in State affairs; a police question,




The view that married women's rights could be affected by the Thir-
teenth Amendment was invoked again one year later during the de-
bates surrounding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
clarified the scope of the Amendment. For example, Senator Cowan
charged that the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would grant
women the right to make and enforce contracts, which would clearly
be unconstitutional because the Thirteenth Amendment did no more
than free those enslaved in the 1860s:
What is the fair construction of that amendment of the Constitution
abolishing slavery? ... What was the involuntary servitude mentioned
there? ... Was it the right the husband had to the services of his wife?
Nobody can pretend that [was] within the purview of that amendment;
nobody believes it. It was mentioned as a matter of ridicule, in some
places.., that it did actually entitle the wife to be paid for her own serv-
ices, that they should not go to the husband .... The true meaning and
intent of that amendment was simply to abolish negro slavery.31
7
Although opponents of Reconstruction may have only intended
to derail the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by stirring up latent fears of
women's rights-the same strategy that another generation of Con-
gressmen opposed to civil rights would employ nearly one hundred
years later in a failed attempt to defeat the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 s-a review of the Reconstruction era's social history con-
316 Id. at 242 (statement of Rep. Cox) (emphasis added) (opposing the 13th
Amendment because of its broad sweep and reordering of federalism); see also
McConnell, supra note 9, at 216 ("Representative Cox was concerned that if Congress
had the power to regulate 'domestic slavery' then perhaps it could exercise this power
to 'change the relation of... husband and wife.'" (omission in original)). Compare
Representative Cox's concern to the federalism objections to the VAWA discussed su-
pra Part II.C.
317 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1784-85 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan).
Senator Cowan believed that the Amendment offered no rights for African-Americans
who had had "free" status before the Civil War or for anyone born "free." He also pro-
tested that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would "confer[] upon married women, upon
minors, upon idiots, upon lunatics, and upon everybody native born in all the States,
the right to make and enforce contracts." Id. at 1782.
318 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989) ("The somewhat
bizarre path by which 'sex' came to be included as a forbidden criterion for employ-
ment-it was included as an attempt to defeat [Title VII]-does not persuade [the
Court] that the legislators' statements pertaining to race are irrelevant to cases alleg-
ing gender discrimination." (citation omitted)).
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firms that the idea that the Thirteenth Amendment affected familial
relations possessed political currency.
First, Congress knew that slavery was more than a system of labor.
Both Amar and McConnell argue that Congress considered the per-
sonal aspects of slavery when it enacted the Thirteenth Amendment
because abolitionist literature had focused on these aspects of slavery
for many years before the Civil War.19 Congress knew that
[s] lave masters intimately associated with slave women. They were the
fathers of slave women. They were the (half) brothers of slave women.
They were the sexual partners of slave women. And sometimes they
were more than one of these things at the same time. They were having
sex with their daughters and their (half) sisters. And this was all very
well understood in the literature of abolitionism.3 2 0
Statements made by Congressmen during the debates support Amar's
argument. For example, Senator Clark described slavery as follows:
[Slavery] has degraded the people to the infamous business of raising
negroes for sale .... She has practiced concubinage, destroyed the
sanctity of marriage, and sundered and broken the domestic ties. She
has bound men, women, and children, robbed them, beat them, bruised• 321
and mangled them, burned and otherwise murdered them.
Amar and Widawsky argue that this congressional awareness of the
public-private nature of slavery explains why the Thirteenth Amend-
ment is applicable to private action.12
Second, many of the leaders of the abolitionist movement were
also women's rights activists. Via the proposed Thirteenth Amend-
ment, women's rights activists lobbied for abolition, suffrage, and a
transformation of the husband-wife relationship.
3,9 See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1367-68 ("[B] oth supporters and oppo-
nents of slavery understood that the 'peculiar institution' was tightly bound up with
private and intimate relations between persons linked by sex and blood. Although
such relations were centuries old, the Thirteenth Amendment broke sharply with cus-
tom . . .. " ); McConnell, supra note 9, at 218-19 (describing the contents of abolitionist
literature); Katyal, supra note 288, at 796-97 (describing the links between prostitution
and slavery).
$20 Amar, Women and the Constitution, supra note 9, at 467.
S21 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1369 (1864) (statement of Sen. Clark).
s2 See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1368 ("To end slavery was thus to radi-
cally restructure this 'private' sphere, and to reorder not simply the political and eco-
nomic system but the social fabric as well. Accordingly, unlike virtually every earlier
provision of the Constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment contained no state action
requirement.").
s2 See DuBois, supra note 281, at 113 (noting that women's rights activists
"collected over 400,000 signatures ... and Senator Charles Sumner gave them much
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The language used by women's suffrage activists for nearly twenty
years before the Thirteenth Amendment debates explicitly evoked
images of slavery.324 While abolitionist literature focused on the sex-
ual, reproductive, and violent aspects of slavery, women's rights litera-
ture called for the vote and other rights as a means to end violence in
marriage.32 Seneca Falls, the first women's rights conference, oc-
curred in 1848, nearly twenty years before the Thirteenth Amend-
ment debates took place. The Seneca Falls conference report
charged that husbands robbed women of their civil rights during
marriage:
He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead. He has
taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns .... In
the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her husband,
he becoming to all intents and purposes, her master-the law giving him power
to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement.3
26
In 1860, at the Tenth National Women's Rights Convention,
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who was more radical than many women's
rights activists, advocated divorce as an end to the "'legalized prostitu-
tion' of coerced marital intercourse and unwilling maternity."
3 27
Thus, by the time of the Thirteenth Amendment debates in 1864 and
1865, women had already been lobbying for change in the husband-
of the credit for the ultimate passage of the Thirteenth Amendment"). The insertion
of the words "male inhabitants" into Section 2 of the 14th Amendment dashed the
hopes of women's rights advocates that the 13th Amendment would be read expan-
sively to encompass women's suffrage. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Women's
rights activists continued to claim the Reconstruction Amendments, including the
13th, as constitutional authority for women's right to vote. For example, testifying be-
fore Congress in the 1870s to advocate for a statute enfranchising women, Victoria
Woodhull argued that "'women, white and black, have from time immemorial groaned
under what is properly termed in the Constitution "previous condition of servitude."'"
DuBois, supra note 281, at 124 (quoting 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note
281, at 455). "Thus, when the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, it also abol-
ished the subordinate condition of women." Id. This theory, however, was repudiated
by the Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874), which held that
voting is not a privilege and immunity of citizenship.
324 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2126-29 (noting an example of the way in which the
rhetoric of women's rights advocates paralleled that of the abolitionists).
325 See id. at 2129 ("[S]tate-sanctioned violence in the marriage relationship evi-
denced fundamental defects in its structure and proved the justice of women's de-
mand to participate in the enactment and enforcement of the laws.").
32 Siegel, supra note 9, at 2128 (quoting REPORT OF THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS
CONVENTION, HELD AT SENEcA FALLs, N.Y., JULY 19TH & 20TH, 1848, at 6 (Rochester,
John Dick 1848)).
32 Dubois, supra note 281, at 111.
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wife relationship for nearly twenty years, drawing upon the language
of abolitionists for intellectual and emotional authority.
In addition, according to Reva Siegel, by the end of the Civil War,
courts had begun to repudiate the "prerogative of chastisement," an
328incident of common-law marriage. Judges began to equate domes-
tic violence with slavery. For example, Siegel quotes an Alabama
judge who wrote in an 1871 domestic violence case opinion:
The husband is therefore not justified or allowed by law to use such a
weapon, or any other .... The wife is not to be considered as the hus-
band's slave. And the privilege, ancient though it be, to beat her with a
stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the
floor.., is not now acknowledged by our law .... [I]n person, the wife




Siegel cautions against a radical reading of this opinion, authored
by a former slave holder, because both plaintiff and defendant were
recently freed slaves. Rather than heralding a new era for gender re-
lations, the case was more likely an assertion of race privilege; that is,
only slave masters were entitled to beat black women.uo Despite its
racist subtext, the Alabama case demonstrates that legal thinkers in
the late-1800s had linked familial violence to slavery. 3'
This historical evidence demonstrates that Congress was not act-
ing in a vacuum when it passed the Amendment and that the settled
interpretation that the Amendment reaches only labor relations and
racial discrimination may be a judicial gloss added later.3 2 This his-
torical evidence, at the very least, strengthens the argument that, as
adopted, the Thirteenth Amendment had the potential to reorder
32 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2130.
32 Id. at 2135 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fulgham v.
State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871)). Siegel also noted that "[t]he Massachusetts Su-
preme Court rejected a husband's prerogative to chastise his wife in the 1871 case of
Commonwealth v. McAfee[, 108 Mass. 458 (1871)]." Id. at 2130.
See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2135-41 (describing a trend of cases in which exam-
ples were made out of black men for wife-beating and the Ku Klux Klan's use of "wife
beating" as an excuse for attacking black and white men).
33 See id. at 2135 ("Though the text of the Fulgham opinion addresses gender rela-
tions, the case seems to resonate with racial preoccupations."). The linkage makes
more sense when one considers that many slave women were related to their
"masters."
"2 See Amar, Women and the Constitution, supra note 9, at 467 ("Women, in short,
were in large part the agents and the subjects of the Thirteenth Amendment. They
were agents, because women publicly mobilized for the Abolitionist movement; and
they were subjects, because half of the people who were emancipated were female.").
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the nineteenth-century familial structure and the status of free
women and slave women.3  By extension, the Thirteenth Amend-
ment also reaches incidents of nineteenth-century slavery and com-
mon-law marriage that persist in preventing women from claiming
their full citizenship rights today.3
E. Final Objections to a Thirteenth Amendment Theory for the VAWA:
Griffin and Its Progeny
The final objection to Thirteenth Amendment support for the
VAWA is that the Thirteenth Amendment covers only racial, not gen-
der, discrimination. Because the VAWA is couched in terms of gen-
der discrimination, this objection could be fatal to a Thirteenth
Amendment theory for the civil rights remedy. The Supreme Court
has never addressed directly whether the Thirteenth Amendment
protects against gender discrimination, dancing around the issue in
Griffin v. Breckenridg 3 and its progeny. These cases interpret 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), a Reconstruction-era civil cause of action for private
conspiracies that deprive others of "the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws."33 6 In Griffin,
the Supreme Court upheld § 1985(3) as a valid exercise of Congress's
Thirteenth Amendment, Section 2 power to regulate the "badges and
incidents" of slavery. 37 The Court's treatment of gender discrimina-
333 See McConnell, supra note 9, at 215-16 ("Some Congressmen expressed concern
that the Thirteenth Amendment had the potential to reach into the private sphere of
the home and to alter the traditional relationship between husband and wife.").
'3' See infra Part III.G.
33 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). The statute provides:
If two or more persons.., conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on
the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indi-
rectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws... [and] in any case of con-
spiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having
and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the con-
spirators.
Id.
d7 See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105 ("We can only conclude that Congress was wholly
within its powers under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory
cause of action for Negro citizens who have been the victims of conspiratorial, racially
discriminatory private action aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law
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tion under § 1985(3) might prove instructive in predicting how the
Court would rule on a claim that the VAWA is a valid invocation of
Congress's Section 2 powers. The VAWA and § 1985(3) are alike in
that both apply to private action. In addition, the gender-related
animus requirement in the VAWA is explicitly derived from cases in-
terpreting § 1985(3), namely Griffin and Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic. 3 The VAWA, however, differs from § 1985(3) in one
key respect: The VAWA creates a substantive right-the right to be
free from gender-motivated violence-and a remedy, whereas
§ 1985 (3) is merely a vehicle to address the private abrogation of con-
stitutional and/or statutory rights existing elsewhere. 339 In Griffin,
which involved racial discrimination, 40 the Court upheld the princi-
ple that Congress has the authority to control private action via the
Thirteenth Amendment.3 41 Out of a concern that § 1985(3) not be-
come a general federal tort law, however, the Court held that plain-
tiffs must show "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidi-
ously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."3 2 After
Griffin, the question became whether discrimination against women
was "otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.
343
The Supreme Court has declined to address that issue twice: in
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny 44 and in Bray.45
In Novotny, a man claimed the protection of § 1985(3) when he was
fired from his job after expressing support for female employees who
secures to all free men."); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440
(1968) ("Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally
to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to
translate that determination into effective legislation.").
506 U.S. 263 (1993); see supra Part I.C.2 (defining gender-motivated animus and
detailing its development in caselaw as applied to § 1985 and the VAWA).
-9 Because it creates a substantive right, the VAWA is analytically distinct from the
Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1983, and 1981. See
Nourse, supra note 2, at 8 ("[T]hose remedies provide no analogue for the substantive
right created by [the VAWA] 'to be free' from gender-motivated violence.").
340 The action arose when two white men stopped a car of African-Americans and
severely beat them. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 91.
341 The Court cited Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. for the proposition that Congress
may legislate against "'the badges and the incidents of slavery.'" Id. at 105 (quoting
Jones, 392 U.S. at 440).
312 Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. There are additional requirements for a cause of action
under § 1985(3) involving the conspiracy element. See id. at 102-03 (describing the
criteria for stating a cause of action under § 1985(3)).
3" Id. at 102.
'" 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
4' 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
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846were being denied equal employment opportunities. Novotny
claimed that the "privilege, or immunity" of which he was deprived by
the Association officers' conspiracy was his Title V1134 7 right against
sex discrimination in employment. 8 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that women are a protected class under §
1985(3) . The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit decision,
but the majority failed to reach the issue of § 1985(3) and gender dis-
crimination. Instead, the Court narrowly held that "§ 1985(3) may
not be invoked to redress violations of Title VII,"5 0 because to do so
would allow a plaintiff to circumvent the administrative scheme cre-
ated by Congress in Title VII. 51
In his concurrence, Justice Powell implied that he would have
held that § 1985(3) failed to reach gender discrimination. First, Jus-
tice Powell stressed that § 1985(3) neither creates free-standing rights
nor provides a remedy for subsequently adopted statutory rights. It
352
only enforces rights already existing in the Constitution. He then
found no constitutional right to "be free of gender-based discrimina-
tion perpetuated solely through private action."3 5 3  Thus, he con-
cluded that § 1985(3) does not cover gender discrimination by pri-
vate actors.
In contrast, Justice White (joined in his dissent by Justices
Brennan and Marshall) stated that § 1985(3) encompasses gender
16 See Novotny, 442 U.S. at 369 (explaining that petitioner alleged that "[h]is sup-
port for the Association's female employees... was the cause of the termination of his
employment").
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (prohibiting an employer from discriminating
against employees who have protested those employment practices made illegal by
other sections of the Act).
348 See Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372 (explaining that the primary issue in the case "is
whether a person injured by a conspiracy to violate § 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is deprived of 'the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privi-
leges and immunities under the laws' within the meaning of§ 1985(3)").
39 See Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1262 (3d Cir.
1978) (concluding "[t]hat § 1985(3) protects against conspiracies motivated by dis-
criminatory animus against women" and "[tihat a male injured in furtherance of such
a conspiracy has standing to bring an action under § 1985(3)"), revd, 442 U.S. 366
(1979).
S5 Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378.
"' See id. at 376.
'5 See id. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the reach of§ 1985(3) "is lim-
ited to conspiracies to violate those fundamental rights derived from the Constitu-
tion").
3 Id. at 381 (Powell,J., concurring).
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discrimination. s ' In a footnote, Justice White wrote: "It is clear that
sex discrimination may be sufficiently invidious to come within the
prohibition of § 1985(3). " 55 Justice White did not specify whether
the coverage derives from a constitutional source or a statutory
356source.
By 1983, in United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v.
Scott,957 there were at least four Justices who agreed that § 1985(3)
covers gender discrimination. 36 Once again, the majority did not ad-
dress gender discrimination because the case concerned animus
against nonunion members.ss9 The majority stated that "it is a close
question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based
animus other than animus against Negroes and those who champi-
oned their cause, most notably Republicans." 6° In contrast, Justice
Blackmun addressed gender-based animus, writing: "[C]ertain class
traits, such as race, religion, sex, and national origin, per se meet [the
animus] requirement .... 36 1
"4 See id. at 388 & n.5, 388 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he words.., in § 1985(3)
refer to substantive rights created or guaranteed by... the Constitution or federal
statutes other than § 1985 (3) . . ").
Id. at 389 n.6 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See id. at 388 n.5 (White, J., dissenting) ("I think it clear that § 1985(3) encom-
passes all rights guaranteed in federal statutes as well as rights guaranteed directly by
the Constitution.").
'7 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
See id. at 853 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, & O'Connor, JJ., dis-
senting) (identifying gender as one of the class traits that per se falls under the protec-
tion of§ 1985(3)).
9 See id. at 829 (discussing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). The
majority held that in order to bring a § 1985(3) action grounded in the First Amend-
ment, plaintiffs must show state action or "that the aim of the conspiracy is to influ-
ence" the state's activity because First Amendment rights are not protected against
private action; and that animus against nonunion workers does not meet the standards
for class-based animus. Id. at 829-34.
Id. at 837. The majority did concede that Congress may have intended
§ 1985(3) to have a broad scope, quoting the often-cited language from the legislative
history for § 1985(3) that the section would include conspiracies formed against
someone "because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or
because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter." CONG. GLOBE, 42nd
Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871).
" United Brotherhood, 463 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
devoted most of his dissent to a discussion of Reconstruction Congress members' be-
liefs that the 14th Amendment created rights of national citizenship that were pro-
tected from private action. Thus, it appears that he may have been defining the pro-
tected classes in terms of the 14th Amendment, as opposed to the 13th Amendment.
See id. at 842-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that members of the Reconstruc-
tion Congress believed that the 14th Amendment conferred a right of national citi-
zenship that could be violated in the absence of state action).
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Interestingly, Justice White, who wrote the Novotny dissent, wrote
the opinion of the Court in United Brotherhood; and Justice Blackmun,
who wrote the United Brotherhood dissent, had joined the Novotny ma-
jority. Neither majority opinion addressed gender. It is therefore
possible that in 1979 there were four Justices who would have held
that gender discrimination is invidious class-based animus (Justices
White, Brennan, and Marshall, plus Justice Blackmun), and that in
1983 there were five (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and
O'Connor, plus Justice White). Although the number of Supreme
Court Justices holding that position was unclear, many lower federal
courts continued to recognize § 1985(3) claims based on gender-
motivated animus362
In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,36 the Supreme Court
again declined an opportunity to find that § 1985(3) covered gender-
motivated animus. In Bray, abortion clinics tried to use § 1985(3) to
enjoin abortion protesters from protesting at clinics a  The clinics
grounded their claim in the right of interstate travel and the right to
abortion.35 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected both claims,
holding that the right to abortion is protected only against state ac-
tion and the right of interstate travel was not implicated.s6 In addi-
tion, Justice Scalia wrote that the animus requirements were not met:
"women seeking abortions" is not a protected class and discrimination
against women seeking abortions is not discrimination against
women. 367 Although Justice Scalia explicitly refused to consider
whether § 1985(3) reaches discrimination against women, he limited
the scope of § 1985(3) if it applied to gender-motivated animus by
m' See, e.g., Volunteer Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 224 (6th
Cir. 1991) ("[W]e find the conclusion inescapable that women constitute a cognizable
class under § 1985(3)."); NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990)
(affirming the district court's judgment that women are a protected class within the
meaning of § 1985(3)), revd on other grounds sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); Scott v. City of Overland Park, 595 F. Supp. 520,
529 (D. Kan. 1984) (holding that women are a class under § 1985(3) and citing the
United Brotherhood dissent).
'3 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
' See id. at 266.
36' See id. at 274-78.
'36 See id. at 276-78 (stating that § 1985(3) protects only rights guaranteed against
both state and private action, namely the 13th Amendment right to be free from in-
voluntary servitude and the right of interstate travel).
67 See id. at 269 (rejecting the district court's conclusion that "women seeking
abortions" constitutes a protected class).
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importing language from Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.3 Potential
plaintiffs now must show that discrimination against them is "'because
of'" and not merely "'in spite of'" their status as women.s 9 Congress
adopted this language in the VAWA's definition of gender-motivated
animus.
Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter reiterated that gender-
biased discrimination is covered by § 1985(3) . Justices Blackmun
and O'Connor also criticized the majority for importing the higher
standard of discriminatory intent from Fourteenth Amendment state
action adjudication into § 1985(3).37
After Bray, it is still unclear whether a majority of the Supreme
Court believes that § 1985(3) covers invidious animus directed to-
wards women. The VAWA, however, declares that gender-motivated
violence against women is a form of gender discrimination and cre-
ates a new statutory right. Unlike § 1985(3), the constitutionality of
the VAWA is not dependent on a substantive right to be free of gen-
der discrimination resident in Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, but rather on a determination that gender discrimination in
the form of gender-motivated violence is a badge or incident of slav-
ery reachable by congressional action under Section 2. Therefore,
Supreme Court opinions regarding gender discrimination and
§ 1985(3) are instructive, rather than precedential, to the resolution
of the Section 2 question.
F. Modern Battering and Child Abuse as Involuntary Servitude
When Congress ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, nineteenth-
century chattel slavery was its reference. In the Civil Rights Cases,3s
the Court granted Congress the authority to legislate against the
"badges and incidents" of nineteenth-century chattel slavery. The
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
U9 Bray, 506 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279).
37o See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d) (1994) (defining a "crime of violence motivated by
gender" as a "crime of violence committed because of gender").
371 See Bray, 506 U.S. at 295-96 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (analogizing the equal protection language of § 1985(3) to the equal
protection language of the 14th Amendment); id. at 349 (O'Connor, J., dissenting,
joined by Blackmun, J.) ("I would still find in [this] case that 1985(3) reaches con-
spiracies targeted at a gender-based class . ").
37 See id. at 353 (O'Connor, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I see no rea-
son to hold a § 1985(3) plaintiff to the constitutional standard of invidious discrimina-
tion that we employed in our Fourteenth Amendmentjurisprudence.").
373 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Thirteenth Amendment, however, is a prohibition of involuntary ser-
vitude and slavery for all time. 74 Therefore, Congress has the power
to legislate against the "badges and incidents" of any form of involun-
tary servitude or slavery in any time.
One example of modem involuntary servitude is child 
abuse;7 5
376
another is severe battering. In an article criticizing the DeShaney de-
cision, Akhil Amar and Daniel Widawsky argue that child abuse is de
facto slavery:
Like an antebellum slave, an abused child is subject to near total domi-
nation and degradation by another person, and is treated more as a pos-
session than as a person .... [I]f a child runs away, the state typically re-
turns her to parental custody, just as antebellum judges returned
fugitive slaves to their masters. And just as antebellum states enforced
the legal rights of masters to physical control over their slaves, today's
states continue to enforce the legal rights of parents to physical control
over their children. 77
If child abuse and child sexual abuse are slavery, then both are
legitimate targets for congressional action under Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Amar and Widawsky argue that differences
between antebellum slaves and abused children should not matter
because the Thirteenth Amendment is an absolute prohibition on
374 The Supreme Court addressed the blanket impact of the 13th Amendment
when it stated:
Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress
which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now
or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall de-
velop slavery... within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to
make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the States which properly
and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection will
apply, though the party interested may not be of African descent.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872).
375 See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 9 (positing that the 13th Amendment applies
to child abuse).
ST7 See McConnell, supra note 9 (arguing that severe battering is involuntary servi-
tude).
s77 Amar & Widawsky, supra note 9, at 1364. Not all parent-child relationships are
slavery, only those where "a parent perverts this coercive authority by systematically
abusing and degrading his ward-treating his child not as a person but as a chattel,
acting as if he had title over the child rather than trusteeship on behalf of the child."
Id. Judges may use existing child abuse laws for assistance in determining when an
ordinary parent-child relationship converts to slavery. See id. at 1377-78 (noting that
most states have laws that provide for criminal punishment for certain kinds of paren-
tal misconduct).
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slavery.37 8 The Thirteenth Amendment should supersede the tradi-
tional notion that the parent-child relationship is exempted from ju-
dicial purview because, if the Thirteenth Amendment never comes
between parent and child, then many slave masters would have been
able to circumvent the amendment by claiming those slaves who were
also their biological children.37 By extension, the Thirteenth
Amendment should also override the husband-wife relationship when
there are conditions of servitude.
Joyce McConnell argues that severe battering also is a modem
form of involuntary servitude and should implicate the Thirteenth
Amendment.m° McConnell sets up her parallel by introducing three
case studies of severe battering and comparing the factual scenarios
to the factual scenarios in criminal involuntary servitude cases.381
McConnell demonstrates that the women in her case studies meet all
of the legal requirements for criminal involuntary servitude,s save
being in an employer-employee relationship. m McConnell concludes
that the lack of an employer-employee relationship should not bar a
conclusion that severe battering is involuntary servitude because the
cases never define "servitude," focusing instead on the definition of
"involuntary"--a standard met in severe battering relationships.-
The coercion requirement for Thirteenth Amendment involun-
tary servitude was established in United States v. Kozminski.3 Kozminski
578 See id. at 1379 (asserting that the "central dictum" of the Civil Rights Cases is that
the 13th Amendment prohibits all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude).
379 See id. at 1374-76 (noting two 19th-century court decisions that stated that par-
ents do not have an absolute right to power over their children).
See McConnell, supra note 9 (claiming that some battered women are held in
involuntary servitude and that the 13th Amendment should reach them).
See id. (presenting the lives of three battered married women).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1994) ("Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involun-
tary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for
any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."); see also id. § 1581(a)
("Whoever holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage... shall be fined
... or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."); 42 id. § 1994 ("The holding of
any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and
forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States....").
n3 See McConnell, supra note 9, at 242 ("In each of these ... cases, the level and
nature of coercion either equals or exceeds the coercion in the involuntary servitude
cases.").
See id. at 221.
487 U.S. 931 (1988). The Kozminskis kept two mentally retarded men on their
farm and forced them to work without pay for up to 17 hours per day. When the two
men tried to escape, they were brought back to the farm, and one was threatened with
institutionalization. See id. at 934-35.
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involved criminal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1584 and 18 U.S.C.§ 386§ 241. The Court in Kozminski defined involuntary servitude as "a
condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the
defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury,
or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal proc-
ess." 87 Psychological coercion without the threat of force or legal
sanction is insufficient to show involuntary servitude.3 Justice Bren-
nan disagreed with the majority on the issue of psychological coer-
cion, writing that such actions as isolating a victim, threatening to
harm a victim's children, and denying a victim pay for her labor
would be sufficient to show involuntariness when a victim is held in "a
relation of complete domination and lack of personal liberty resem-
bling the conditions in which slaves were held prior to the Civil
War.
,3 89
One issue when applying the involuntary servitude standards to
the domestic violence context is whether the initial voluntary en-
trance into a relationship with the abuser nullifies a claim that the
servitude is "involuntary." First, criminal involuntary servitude does
not require that the victim be completely unable to leave. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Bibbs, the Fifth Circuit held that it was irrelevant
to a conviction for holding a person in involuntary servitude that the
victim may have had opportunities to leave if the victim so feared for
her safety that she was afraid to leave.
390
Second, can a woman really leave? Statistics show that a woman is
more likely to be killed after separation from an abusive partner than
before separation.391 In addition, because severe battering often in-
38 Section 241 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code criminalizes conspiracies "to injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person ... in the free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or because of his having so exercised the same." 18 U.S.C. § 241. In this case, the sub-
stantive right is the 13th Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude.
387 487 U.S. at 952.
See id. at 949 (rejecting an overly broad interpretation of involuntary servitude).
389 Id. at 961 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see also id. at 969 (Stevens, J.,
concurring injudgment) ("I agree with Justice Brennan that the reach of [§ 1584] ex-
tends beyond compulsion that is accompanied by actual or threatened physical means
or by the threat of legal action.").
39 564 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977).
"' See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 72-75 (1991) (detailing cases of murder that occurred
after women left abusive partners). Mahoney explains: "At the moment of separa-
tion ... the batterer's quest for control often becomes most acutely violent and poten-
tially lethal." Id. at 5-6. The Bureau of Justice Statistics found divorced or separated
women had "higher rates of violence by intimates (16 per 1000 persons) than women
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volves systematic economic and social isolation of the victim, the
abused woman may lack the financial resources to support herself.'e
Also, her batterer may stalk her39
s or show up at her workplace. 9
When the woman has children, the economic and safety problems are
magnified. Batterers may threaten and abuse the children,39 *' kidnap
them after the mother leaves, or file for custody of the children in396
common. Compare this to the plight of nineteenth-century slave
women who ran away from plantations much less frequently than did
male slaves because of fear for children left behind, or because it
would be too difficult to escape with children in tow.s11 Thus, the
perceived notion that women voluntarily enter abusive relationships
would not necessarily defeat a claim of involuntary servitude.
Another objection to the use of criminal involuntary servitude
standards in the domestic violence context is that victims of domestic
violence are ordinarily not in an employer-employee relationship with
their batterers, excluding those women who work with their batterers
in a family business. However, the type of work performed by women
in some battering relationships, such as housework, may bring the
conflict within the realm of an employer-employee relationship. In
Bernal v. United States,93 for example, the court held that a female
domestic laborer forced to perform housework to pay off a debt was
who never married (7 per 1000) or married women (1.5 per 1000)." BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES 2 (1994).
sn See Mahoney, supra note 391, at 23 (stating that women become poorer after
divorce, and that many homeless women are homeless because they left abusive envi-
ronments).
s See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND STALKING: THE SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AcT (1997)
(noting the observation of criminal justice officials that stalking occurs when women
leave their abusers).
$9 See generally Esta Soler, Reaching Out, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT NEWS
(Violence Against Women Office, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 1996,
at 1, 2 (noting that the U.S. Department of Justice estimates that in the "60,000 inci-
dents of on-the-job violence each year, the victims know their attackers intimately").
395 See NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FACT SHEET-WOMAN
ABUSE... CHILD ABUSE (1994) [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (citing statistics showing a
link between child abuse and domestic violence).
39 See id. (citing studies that show that "[m]ore than 50% of child abductions re-
sult from domestic violence," and that abusive men use custodial access to punish
their victims).
117 See WHITE, supra note 306, at 70-75 (listing differential sex ratios of fugitive
slaves, positing that responsibility for children caused the discrepancy, and illustrating
the point with slave women's narratives); cf. FACr SHEET, supra note 395 (stating that
many women return to abusive relationships out of fear of losing custody of their chil-
dren).
aD 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917).
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399being held in peonage. In addition, battered women are often sub-
ject to forced sex and even to forced prostitution, both covered activi-
ties. Although the idea of rape as a "service" is abhorrent, the court
in Pierce v. United States held that forced prostitution constituted in-
voluntary servitude. 40 0 Therefore, battering relationships are not nec-
essarily exempted by the type of services performed.
McConnell's argument that battering relationships should be
considered involuntary servitude despite the lack of an employer-
employee relationship is strengthened by the argument that the Thir-
teenth Amendment covers the private and familial aspects of slavery
discussed above.0 1 Once severe battering is equated with involuntary
servitude, Congress may legislate directly against it and any of its inci-
dents under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.
If the Doe v. Doe case were to go up for Supreme Court review,
McConnell's arguments might be sufficient because Doe v. Doe in-
402volved a long-term severe battering relationship. Crimes of violence
motivated by gender, however, also include a wide range of isolated
violent crimes and cases of battering that would not meet McCon-
nell's expanded definition of involuntary servitude.0 3 One argument
that could encompass all crimes of violence motivated by gender is
that the other forms of violence are part of a continuum of violence
against women and represent incidents of the modem involuntary
servitude of severe battering. Each crime of violence committed, such
as sexual assault, felonious assault, murder, or kidnapping, could oc-
cur in any given battering relationship. This argument requires tak-
ing an additional step from the thesis that severe domestic violence is
involuntary servitude and may be further than a court would be will-
ing to go. Therefore, McConnell's argument that severe battering is
involuntary servitude404 and Amar and Widawsky's argument that
-" See id. at 341.
'00 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1944) (finding sufficient evidence to support a claim
of peonage when young women were forced to perform acts of prostitution to pay off
debts).
40" See supra Part III.C.
'0' Jane Doe was trapped in an abusive relationship for 17 years that shared many
characteristics of a master-slave relationship. SeeDoe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D.
Conn. 1996).
40- For example, an isolated rape, perpetrated with the requisite gender-motivated
animus, could give rise to a VAWA claim. Seesupra Part I.C.
'" See McConnell, supra note 9.
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child abuse is slavery405 may only provide constitutional justification
for VAWA cases involving severe battering or child abuse.
G. Modern Violence Against Women as an Incident of
Nineteenth-Century Slavery and Marriage
A theory that embraces all crimes of violence motivated by gender
is that gender discrimination in the form of violence constitutes a
badge and incident of nineteenth-century slavery and of a particular
variety of "involuntary servitude," namely, nineteenth-century mar-
riage. Part III.C showed how the violence perpetrated against slave
women was differentiated based on gender, and Part II.A.2 detailed
how married women were subject to chastisement and deprived of
payment for their work in a gender-differentiated fashion under
common-law marriage. The violent acts experienced by women today
are the same violent acts experienced by slave women and chastised
wives in the nineteenth century.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 406 Justice Brennan took judicial notice of
the parallels between chattel slavery and common-law marriage:
[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our
society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the
pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office,
serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women
traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property




Andrea Brenneke links battering today with the status of white
women under the law of the nineteenth century:
[B]attered women sometimes find themselves in relationships in which
they have lost all freedom of movement and integrity of body and mind
to the control and coercion of their husbands. Such a system of
"private" involuntary servitude today has its cultural origins in "public"
laws which treated women as the property of their husbands, allowed
husbands to discipline their wives through violence and prevented
408women from participating in the democratic process.
If one accepts the ideas that (1) slavery and common-law mar-
riage were two forms of legal status that denied women their full citi-
'D" SeeArnar & Widawsky, supra note 9.
0 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (holding that classifications based on sex are
"inherently suspect").
07 Id. at 685.
4's Brenneke, supra note 49, at 41.
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zenship rights; (2) the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment was to
give slaves and people held in involuntary servitude full citizenship
rights; and (3) today, violence prevents women from enjoying the
citizenship rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment, then a
Thirteenth Amendment theory for the VAWA appears logical. An-
other way of stating this argument is that because Congress has the
authority to legislate against the incidents of both slavery and invol-
untary servitude, it has the authority to legislate against the remain-
ders of nineteenth-century legal status that still threaten women's en-
joyment of their Thirteenth Amendment citizenship rights, including
the right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude and the
rights listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 .
When making arguments in this area, it is important to remember
that, while there are many similarities between the lack of citizenship
rights possessed by white women in nineteenth-century marriage and
black women held in slavery, nineteenth-century slavery and marriage
were fundamentally different. McConnell, for example, adamantly
disagrees with any line of reasoning that analogizes white women's
coverture to black women's slavery:
No matter how rhetorically useful this metaphor... may seem now,
it... remains grossly inaccurate and inherently racist. It obscure[s] the
fact that white women were slaveholders or beneficiaries of the slave sys-
tem. It fail [s] to recognize that even though there were significant legal,
political and social restraints on white women, they did not as a class suf-
fer in the way that African Americans did under slavery. Finally, it ig-
nore[s] the fact that African American women were slaves and that
other women were not, no matter what their subordinate legal or socio-
economic status.
One way to avoid the inaccurate metaphor is to argue that mod-
em gender-motivated violence is a carryover from or incident of chat-
tel slavery, the involuntary servitude of nineteenth-century marriage,
or both, depending on the race of the victim. Black women may ar-
gue that gender-motivated violence against them reflects the differen-
tial sex-based violence that occurred as part of chattel slavery
1
and/or that the gender discrimination is an incident of the common-
law form of marriage that included the prerogative of chastisement
and the lack of other citizenship rights. Black women may claim both
because after they were freed from slavery, they ostensibly were sub-
409 See infra text accompanying notes 420-21.
410 McConnell, supra note 9, at 207-08 (footnotes omitted).
41 See supra Part III.C.
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ject to the same lack of rights as white women, at least as a constitu-
tional matter.1 2 White women may argue only the second theory.1
There is some support in the legislative history of the VAWA for a
Thirteenth Amendment theory positing that violence today is a badge
and incident of slavery and the prerogative of chastisement. At the
1991 Senate Hearings, Professor Burt Neuborne argued that Con-
gress had the authority to enact the VAWA because gender discrimi-
nation in the form of gender-motivated violence is a badge and inci-
dent of slavery or involuntary servitude.1 4  The 1991 Senate
Committee Report claimed that the purpose of the civil rights remedy
is to take "aim at gender-discrimination prohibited under the
[Thirteenth A] mendment."41 5 Note that the section in a later 1993
Senate Report on Congress's power to enact the VAWA, which incor-
porated many of the statements from the 1991 report, dropped this
reference.1 6
Neuborne testified before Congress that society had long treated
women "as chattel" or "as slaves," and that Congress "should recog-
nize that there are badges and incidents to the chattel slavery that
women were subjected to."417 Neuborne argued that because "gender-
based violence is denying women an equal status in society, it is pre-
cisely analogous to the badges and incidents of Afro-American slavery
swept away by Congress and the courts in cases following Jones."
41 8
Neuborne concluded that Congress has authority under Section 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment to legislate against the badges of and in-
cidents to women's status as chattel-gender-motivated crimes of vio-
lence.1
112 By "constitutional matter," I mean theoretically as a constitutional matter. Be-
cause of continued racism in society, black women still do not enjoy the same rights as
white women.
"s By referring only to black and white women, I do not mean to suggest that
other women may not assert a 13th Amendment claim under the VAWA. I have spe-
cifically mentioned black and white women, because they are the women with whom
the Reconstruction Congress was concerned. Today, an Asian woman, for example,
could also claim that she inherited her status in contemporary society from the gen-
der-differentiated legal status of white women under common-law marriage.
"' See Vzolence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 80 (1991) (statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor
of Law, New York University) [hereinafter Neuborne].
415 S. REP. NO. 102-197, at53 (1991).
416 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54-55 (1993).




1166 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 146:1097
Another badges-and-incidents argument is that gender-
differentiated violence also inhibits women's citizenship rights as tra-
ditionally defined under the Thirteenth Amendment. Recall that the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Cases defined the rights of
citizenship as follows:
[A] ll persons ... shall have the same right... to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and prop-
erty, as is enjoyed by white citizens ....420
The Civil Rights Cases then granted Congress the authority to regulate
deprivations of these rights. 2' Therefore, if private violence today
precludes women from exercising any of these rights, then Congress
may regulate it.
In relation to applying the commerce power to the VAWA, Con-
gress heard extensive testimony concerning the effect that gender-
motivated violence has on women's employment choices. For exam-
ple, the Senate found that fear of gender-based discriminatory vio-
lence "reduces employment opportunities" by "deter[ring] women
from taking jobs in certain areas or at certain hours that pose a sig-
nificant risk of such violence."42 This deterrence can also be viewed
as an inhibition of the right to form contracts of employment.
CONCLUSION
The civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act may
be at risk of being held unconstitutional under a Commerce Clause
theory in the aftermath of United States v. Lopez.4u The historical do-
mestic relations exclusion of divorce, custody, and alimony cases from
federal courts may add logical resonance to a decision striking down
the VAWA under the Commerce Clause. Although five district courts
have upheld the remedy under the Commerce Clause, one did so
"reluctantly," citing federalism concerns, and two others certified the
question on interlocutory appeal. In addition, if a reviewing court de-
termines that the VAWA is unconstitutional under the Commerce
'20 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)); see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16 (1883) (quoting this
language).
421 109 U.S. at 20.
' S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993); seesupra Part I.E.2.
" 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Clause, it may also draw on the historically pedigreed doctrines of
state action and marital property, and strike down the remedy under
the Fourteenth Amendment as well. Consequently, there is a need
for an alternative basis for congressional power to enact the remedy.
Congress's Thirteenth Amendment, Section 2 power to legislate
against actual conditions of, badges of, and incidents to slavery and
involuntary servitude provides this alternative basis of authority.
The VAWA includes a private civil rights remedy designed to
combat gender discrimination that takes the form of crimes of vio-
lence motivated by gender. The Thirteenth Amendment applies re-
gardless of state action, federalism, and privacy because it has always
reached private action and represented a fundamental change in fed-
eralism when adopted. Thus, there are two possible theories that
provide Thirteenth Amendment authority. First, Congress had the
power to enact the VAWA, at least in regard to domestic violence,
child abuse, and sexual abuse of children, because those three condi-
tions are modem forms of involuntary servitude. Second, Congress
had the power to enact the VAWA because modem gender discrimi-
nation in the form of gender-motivated violence is an incident of
both nineteenth-century slavery and the nineteenth-century involun-
tary servitude of common-law marriage. Although neither of these
theories has been argued in a case concerning the VAWA, lawyers
who bring VAWA suits and face constitutional challenges should con-
sider including a Thirteenth Amendment defense of the VAWA in
their arguments.
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